PERTINENT PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS

Reference books:

About the 1973 October-war
How the revolution confronts the imperialist and counter revolutionary conspiracy
The Arab region: The current situation and the prospect for the future

Arab Ba'th Socialist Party

PERTINENT PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS

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Editor's Note

The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party regards all Arabs as being part of one nation both in the cultural and spiritual sense. The different countries in which they live, make up a politically and economically united fatherland. In the Party's documents, 'the Arab fatherland' means all the Arab countries. Each of these is a 'qotr' which, literally translated, means country; in the Ba'th context, it should be read as province or region. The adjective 'Quotri' (provincial, regional) is used when referring to an individual country. The adjective 'qawmi' (national), on the other hand, is used when referring to all the countries which together make up the one fatherland. Thus, the National Directorate deals only with matters concerning the whole fatherland. Each Regional Directorate deals with matters within its own country. As for example, the Lebanese or Jordanian Regional Directorate deals with matters within its own country. As for example, the Lebanese or Jordanian Regional Directorate etc.

The word Ba'th can be translated as meaning revival, resurgence or renewal. Hitherto, resurgence seems to be the meaning which is preferred by Arab intellectuals and foreign Arab experts.

Pertinent problems and questions

Excerpts from the book: *The Region: What is It and Where is It Going?*

1. There are strange things going on in the region. We notice direct and indirect activities, whose aims are obvious or secret and whose meanings are clear or obscure. We hear contradictory statements and paradoxical predictions. This is proof that the region is stirring and that important events will occur in the very near future.

The Region: What is It and Where is It Going? 3rd edition p. 10

2. Even in the worst of cases, the Security Council's resolution guarantees the Zionist agression important gains. At the same time, it does not, in practice, impose on it a commitment to withdraw from positions it has acquired through agression. There is no example in ancient or modern history of an occupying force that has made a «gift» of its withdrawal.

Ibid. p. 14

3. Before the agression, American interests were the most far-reaching and dangerous imperialist interests in the region. Now, five and a half years later, we find that

these interests have grown and intensified, even in the countries which submitted to agression.

Ibid. p. 41

4. The wise «advice» of a few Arab politicians will not persuade American imperialism to withdraw. American imperialism will not abandon its present position, and it will not «force» the Zionist enemy to turn back unless, obviously, it is forced to, or if «abandoning its present position» yields better results than those obtained by support for the Zionist enemy.

Ibid. p. 43

5. Whoever decides to lead a battle must forsee the worst and take it into account, for the possibility of victory does not lie in the joyful hypotheses encouraged by enormous reserves.

Ibid. p. 53

6. The chasm between the Arab population and a number of their regimes has not disappeared, it has on the contrary become more and more profound and menacing. In most of the Arab countries, the people are deprived of their most elementary democratic rights. This state of affairs can only paralyse the leaders and make them incapable of leading a long and victorious battle.

Ibid. p. 53

Preface

The articles assembled and presented in the work *Pertinent problems and questions* were published in the newspaper «Al-Thawra» between November 7 and 27, 1973.

The region: what is it and were is it going? is an appropriate introduction for this kind of book.

The region: what is it and where is it going? is neither a collection of prophesies whisch are being fulfilled in the Arab land, a number of opinions on the events of October 6 and the following days, or a series of conjectures.

This book is very simply a rigorous mathematical analysis, based on tangible truths, first hand data, and an analysis of the developments which inevitably brought «clashes» of arms and «thawing» operations such as those of October.

Many have undertaken such a scientific analysis, inspired by the history of a people who have known liberation movements, their experiences, the realities of the Arab nation, its potential, and the ancient and modern history of the region. They have traced the path that led to liberation and the recovery of the dignity of a nation that had been humiliated and assaulted by a series of schemes and plots which began befote 1948 and continue to this day.

Today, we are trapped in a web of events: the execution of plots in Palestine which consecrate the

existence of Zionism and its rape of the Arab land, the denial of the rights of the Palestinian people, and «Arab» recognition of what the press and other news media term «a just and lasting peace». Despite this trap, there are a few voices which rise in defiance of the confederates, the protagonists, the actors and the directors. They cry: «Why?»

Why all this?

While the latter hold their ears and pursue their «game», 150 million Arabs fix their eyes more intently on the scene, for they know intuitively that the most vile of plots is being prepared and that to «play» in this way is like playing with fire.

I

More than six years have passed since the agression of June, 1967, which resulted in, among other things, the occupation of Egyptian and Syrian territories and the part of Palestinian territory which had not already been annexed to the kingdom of Jordan. On October 6, 1973, after this long period, the Egyptian and Syrian governments launched a full scale war against the Zionist enemy with the rallying cry «liberation of occupied land».

On October 22, 1973, on the concerted initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Security Council voted a resolution establishing a cease fire and asking for the implementation of resolution 242 which it had voted in 1967. The two super powers, the United Nations and the Security Council offered their guarantees. The Egyptian government accepted this resolution the same day, but the Syrian government only agreed to the second resolution, and not until two days later, on October 24. However, it should be noted that the second resolution is essentially based on the one of 1967.

The Arab populations, our brothers in the Egyptian and Syrian governments and our friends in the world know our opinion of resolutions 242 of 1967 and the one of 1973, which we explained our motives for rejecting. They also know our point of view on imperialist Zionist agresssion and the best way to confront it. We have explained this on numerous occasions and in many ways, and will not repeat here arguments we have already

advanced. We do propose to make an effort to debate questions we consider fundamental by looking at them in light of some realistic and self-evident factors.

The factors which, to our way of thinking, will not provoke any disagreement among the above mentioned parties are: patriotism, Arab solidarity and realistic assumptions about the situation in the Arab countries and in the world.

No one will deny the importance of the agression of June, 1967, or its impact on the situation in directly affected countries, the Arab land, the entire region, and international affairs.

We do not wish to question the right of the states directly affected to try to eliminate the after effects of the agression by any means they consider fit. We do not wish to deny that international organizations and the great powers necessarily have a point of view to express, a role to play and pressure to exercise in the conflict. However, we think that there are two fundamental aspects of the problem which must not be neglected.

1. The agression of June, 1967, albeit very important, is not the «origin» of the acute and explosive conflict in the Arab region. The origin of this extremely complex and serious problem lies in the usurpation of a part of the Palestian soil by Zionism, and the creation of a colonial and expansionist entity, intimately bound to imperialist aims in the region and constituting an enormous obstacle to the liberation, unity and progress of our nation.

The Arab nation has risen against the Zionist usurpation, it has refused to recognize it and has mobilized all of its liberating and progressive forces to fight it in many ways and at many levels. In reality, the June 1967 agression is only a consequence of the original problem, even if it demonstrates the amplitude and tragic nature of the problem.

The June 1967 agression was only a consequence of a more basic problem, and we are convinced that without resolving the basic problem equitably and on a global scale we cannot reach a settlement of the so-called

«regional problem» and for this reason, despite all efforts, guarantees and forces in place, will not establish what the interested parties like to call a «just and lasting peace in the region». Thus, the situation will remain explosive and the region subject to conflicts which will break out sooner or later.

2. To admit that the governments of Arab regions directly affected by the June '67 agression have the right to try to recover their occupied territories by what they consider adequate means raises the following points:

A. Any patriotic government of a country that has been subjected do foreign occupation will try to put an end to this occupation without abandoning any part of its national territory, no matter what its strategic and economic value, for the integrity of national soil has been one of the most cherished human values for centuries. We are also correct when we say that a government which abandons any part of its national territory has lost many of its patriotic values. It is thus normal that the people in question reject this attitude and revolt against the agreements that sanction this abuse. It is aqually normal for countries whose bonds to these people are like national bonds and national political forces who sympathize with these people to give their point of view and take a stand.

B. On the basis of considerations such as «Arab solidarity», the governments of the countries which had been occupied or been the object of the '67 agression must try to make the retreat of the enemy total, and under no circumstances accept a partial withdrawal that would leave another country's territories occupied. We must not forget that all of these states fought under the same command in 1967, and two of them fought together in 1973. We are also not mistaken when we say that any harm done to any one of the parties directly involved in the «compromise» will undoubtedly provoke disagreement between the governments in question as well as between different states in the region. In fact, any such wrong doing would engender problems which other parts of the region —sister parts— could not

ignore and which would force them to take certain stands.

The result of either of the possibilities mentioned in paragraphs A and B would be the same, for according to a realistic analysis based on the history of humanity and the history of the region, no compromise whatsoever can be guaranteed, for compromise does not have the essential and universally recognized elements which are necessary for a lasting and just peace. This is true no matter what the various theories on and conceptions of peace are.

There is another question of capital importance for nationalist and realistic points of view. If governments whose territories were occupied in June '67 have the right to seek to put an end to this occupation by means they consider adequate, they do not, in our opinion, have the right to accept the recognition of the Zionist entity as either and element of a solution or compromise meant to remedy the effects of agression, or as one of the prices to be paid.

To recognize the Zionist entity is to recognize the Zionist usurpation of an Arab territory, Palestine. This, considered in light of regional sovereignty and Arab solidarity (not to mention the national factor) is not within the jurisdiction of any Arab government. In addition, recognition cannot be justified without taking into account the role that the state taking the initiative played in the October war or preceding conflicts.

According to the Arab conception of right, the Zionist entity is not simply an «enemy state», which can be recognized and with which relations can be established after hostile relations have beeen transformed or disappeared —as has been the case among us, among Great Britain and France, and generally, among the nations of the world. We are confronted by an usurping entity, imported, imposed on the Arabs by force, and established on a part of their national soil. The result has been the dispersion of the people who live in this territory, the Palestinian Arabs. It is thus natural for the

Arabs not to recognize this entity. Once this has been given, it is up to the governments or different Arab forces to decide whether or not to fight the Zionist entity. This is their problem, and they must take the responsibility for it.

We are not mistaken when we say that recognition of the Zionist existence on one part of the Arab soil, no matter what its area, does not differ in principle or result from the recognition of the usurpation of other Arab territories, including the ones occupied at present. The matter never becomes more than relative; in other words, the basic question is the amount of national soil that governments in power in any country will «permit» the enemy to usurp.

This is the truth.

It is essential to discuss this point further, even if it leads to a certain verbosity. In the 1950's, France still occupied Algeria and pretended that this country was part of French soil. In 1956, France, Great Britain and the Zionist entity together attacked Egypt and occupied part of its territory.

This is the question: if, at this time, France with the aid of any group of nations, had made its withdrawal from Egypt conditional on Arab and Egyptian recognition of Algeria as a part of French soil, would Egypt or any of the Arab countries have accepted such a demand? The logical answer is no, for the French occupation of Egypt was the result of agression, and it was up to Egypt, its Arab brothers and its friends in the world to put an end to this occupation, the British occupation and the Zionist occupation by any means they considered fit. However, it was not their place to recognize the right of France to usurp Algerian territory and to transform Algeria's reality as a nation in return for withdrawal.

Similarly, we do not think that it is up to any Arab government or any group of countries to accept Zionist withdrawal from Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian territories (according to the official order) on the condition that the Zionist entity be recognized.

We insist again that this discussion is based on

criteria of respect for the liberty of every government to choose their means to resolve their national problems and on the consideration of Arab solidarity which is fitting for all of us. We do not want to question the present undertakings of our brother Arab governments now. There will be other occasions and another logic for that discussion.

However, we do insist on asking this question: what are the limits of their present ventures? If these boundaries are within the framework of their rights, patriotic powers, and the principles of nationalism and Arab solidarity, we wish them success. But if their efforts go beyond these rights and political powers to the great national concern of whether or not to recognize the Zionist usurpation of any part of Arab soil whatsoever, and if the cession of a part of Arab soil in Palestine leads to the abandonment of any Arab territories belonging to any other countries...?

These are the great questions.

II

It is possible that several official Arab parties share our opinion and recognize that they have neither the right nor the power to renounce their claim to any part of Arab Palestine. On the basis of the logic of territorial sovereignty, patriotic powers and Arab solidarity, which we have established as a point of departure; these parties can say —and, in effect, they have said— the rights of the people of Palestine are their own affair...

Speak to them, and ask their opinion.

We have no intention of engaging in a polemic with any one of these parties, but permit us a few quick comments, which we hope will not be prejudicial to anyone. Since 1948, most of the Arab governments have never considered the Palestinians, their cause or their rights; they have never consulted them except in two cases: when they needed their approval for a given position and when (after the accord of certain Palestinian factions had been assured) their opinion could serve to justify the renunciation of certain rights. But as soon as the people of Palestine had a different point of view or tried to find their own route to the recovery of their own rights, woe unto them. At that point, the brothers no longer spoke to them, they brandished clubs and rifles in order to crush and silence them. We do not think it is necessary to give examples, and besides, this is just a passing comment.

We do not intend to question the fact that the subject

of debate is within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian people and that it is absolutely necessary to consult them. However, it is important to know how to go about obtaining the opinion of these people.

1. Unlike other people whose countries have been occupied, the Palestinian people have no government to represent or speak for them. We raise this point not to encourage the parties involved to form such a government or give our approval to such an undertaking, but simply to clarify the matter in order to respond to the question at hand.

2. To consult a given people on a matter of substance such as this falls within the framework of what is called «the right to self determination». It is universally recognized that people who have sought to take their destiny in their own hands have always done this through their own nation; there is no case in the history of mankind when a people expelled from their country have decided their fate while living outside of that country. How can the Palestinian people, in all liberty, take charge of their own destiny when a large number of their sons live under the power of those who have torn their land away from them and occupied it by force, and when the majority of the others live in a country whose government has accepted the resolution of the Security Council, thus proving that it wants the Palestinian people to use their «right of self determination» to determine their own exile or renounce a part of their national territory?

Self determination involves a number of recognized means, for example, the referendum. But how can we ask the Palestinian people, who live in a territory that belongs to them but is occupied at present by the Zionists, whether, in all freedom, they wish to renounce their right to all or part of their national territory?

Can we consult the Palestinians living in Egypt, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Jordan, or in other countries, on the same subject? What would be the reaction of the states that have accepted the Security Council's resolution and other parties who believe in it and seek to

implement it, if the result of this hipothetical referendum was that the Palestinian people did not want to renounce their rights to even a portion of their land?

3. Many consider our question naive and shrug their shoulders mockingly. Some of them would say: there is an Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (OLP) and Organizations of Palestinian resistance; they represent the Palestinian people, there is no need for consultation. Go to them and ask their opinion.

We do not want to embark on a discussion of this subject before assuring that we do not mean to contradict this point of view. On the contrarty. Our attitude towards the resistance organizations and the OLP is well known and it is not necessary to belabor this point. Nevertheless, we would like to pursue our line of reasoning and point out certain aspects which seem essential to us.

How have the Palestinian resistance organization and the OLP merited the title of the legitimate representatives of the people of Palestine?

We are convinced that if these institutions, thanks to their base and leadership, have deserved this title and the support of the Arab masses, it is because, on the one hand, they have refused in principle to abandon any part whatsoever of the Palestinian soil and on the other, they have militated for the recovery of their country and chosen armed struggle and sacrifice in order to reach this goal. This is how they have merited the title of the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people, and this is as it should be.

When people are deprived of their rights and expelled from their country by force and by terror, the leaders and the institutions who courageously guide them home and show them the way to recover their usurped rights become, in reality, their representatives.

However, is it possible for the leaders who have thus become the legitimate representatives of the people to maintain this title if they decided —and this is only a hipotesis to clarify the matter— to abandon any part of their territory, specially before even an inch

of it on which to stand has been liberated?

Let us suppose —and again, this is only a hipothesis— that the OLP and the Palestinian resistance organizations agreed to recognize the Zionist entity and everything that that implies, namely, the abandonment of a portion of the Palestinian national territory. At the stage of the so-called «compromise» this raises two questions:

1. The same rules that we mentioned in reference to the jurisdiction of governments in the settlement of the question of occupation apply to this agreement. We have said that when a government decides to abandon any part of its national territory, it loses many of its patriotic values. It is thus normal that the people concerned reject this abuse and revolt against the agreements which would consecrate it. It is equally normal for countries with close ties to these people, such as national ties, and patriotic political forces who sympathize with the cause of these people to give their opinions and take a stand.

2. The organization of Palestinian resistance and the OLP owe their great influence on the Palestinian masses as well as Arab and international opinion to the positions they have taken previously, and which we have mentioned, namely, the refusal to deny Palestinian rights and the struggle to recover them. But, should they behave differently, in other words, should they abuse any of these rights, we believe that they would no longer have the same influence. While they are supreme in the struggle for the recovery of the rights of their own people, they cannot compete with the numerous and powerful forces who race to abandon the rights of the Palestinians.

Who then represents people of Palestine? How can they be consulted?

It seems to us —and this is not because of our so-called extremist theories but because of our realistic conceptions— that no party can agree to the cession of any Palestinian rights and remain a true and strong representative of the people of Palestine, capable of truly

mastering events. This is why we think that there is no realistic justification for soliciting the opinion of the people of Palestine if those who recommend it try to obtain a renunciation of the historic rights of the Palestinians in other ares in order to justify their recognition of the Zionist entity. We believe thas this is the goal of such an undertaking, for the presently prevailing opinion of the Palestinian people is the same as the one that they have expressed for more than a quarter of a century: they demand the right to their country.

If a referendum takes place, and if it results in an agreement to abandon a part of Palestine, we would suspect —and this is not an accusation— that it had been achieved by means of some kind of pressure, and we believe that a solution based on coertion cannot lead to what is called a «just and lasting peace in the region». In fact, if after the «compromise», the Palestinian people feel that they have been victims of an injustice, they will never cease to work to undo it. Furthermore, everyone should remember that the Palestinian people are an Arab people, and that they are not alone in the world. Since the whole Arab nation has espoused their cause and suffered the consequences of this support for more than a quarter of a century, we expect that a «compromise» would sooner or later return the nation to the situation of just after 1948, even if there is a turn of events due to the evolution of circumstances or what the «compromise» reveals. Whatever positions the states take, and whatever agreements they sign, they will not have a real and profound impact on the nation unless the nation is convinced that they are just, if it is not convinced —and it is perfectly normal for a nation to be unpersuaded by the abandonment of its historic rights —it is possible that the governments will fall and the agreements be torn up. The history of mankind and the history of the entire region bear witness to our words.

III

There is another aspect of our conception that merits reflexion and analysis, even if it is necessary to insist on it. We believe that if we ignore one of the aspects of the situation for any reason whatsoever, we cannot arrive at what is termed a «just and lasting peace» which is the objective of those who have accepted the two resolutions of the Security Council.

This is the question: why did all the regimes of the neighbors of the Zionist entity and of all the other Arab regions refuse to recognize this entity for twenty five years and endure all that they endured as a result of this refusal? Why do they now express their desire to recognize it on the condition that resolution 242, voted by the Security Council in 1967, be applied?

When the creation of what is called the «State of Israel» was announced on May 15, 1948, the great powers and scores of countries with diverse political orientations recognized this state. The Arab governments, instead of recognizing it, went to war with it, and even though this war did not lead to the elimination of the Zionist entity and the liberation of the usurped Arab land, all the Arab governments maintained their original stand and refused to recognize this «State».

At this time, these states were not free to act as a function of their national aspirations. Egypt and Iraq were held to a treaty which made them dependent on Great Britain, who maintained military bases in the two

countries. Jordan was more or less a British protectorate. Syria had just obtained its independence and rid itself of French colonialism, but it was still suffering from the serious after-effects of foreign domination. The other Arab countries and regimes were not in a better situation, their situations were in fact worse.

The end of the war of 1948 brought important changes to the region, particularly in Syria and then in Egypt. New regimes and new forces came to power. Some have remained, as in Egypt, where the regime established by the revolution of July 23, 1952, is still strong. Others, such as in Syria, have changed several times. Nevertheless, over a long period of time, their position of the question of recognition of the Zionist entity did not change.

What is important is that the new regimes in power in Egypt and Syria after 1948 as well as the other Arab regimes, whether they have changed or not, did not modify their original position: non-recognition of the Zionist entity.

Naturally, the refusals to recognize the Zionist entity, leaving aside the seriousness of the governments in the past and their real desire to demonstrate this seriousness in a struggle for liberation against the Zionist entity, were never for a moment empty words. Since its creation, the Zionist entity has considered this simple refusal to recognize it a «hostile attitude» and a sufficient pretext for agression against its neighbors and occupation of new territories. The great powers, for their part, did not look favorably on the Arab position. Certain of those among them, particularly the colonial powers who had control over a number of Arab states, tried to pressure them into changing their position, reconciling themselves with the Zionist entity, and recognizing and establishing relations with it. This was also the attitude of the United Nations.

In the 1950's the Zionist enemy committed two agressions against Egypt: one in 1955 and the other in 1956. The second, in which France and Great Britain participated, led to the occupation of the Sinai. The same thing happened eleven years later, in 1967. During

the 50's and the 60's the enemy also committed a series of more or less violent agressions against Syria and Jordan.

Despite all this, the official position of the Arabs on the question of recognition remained the same, and no exterior force was able to impose its modification.

The price of the determination not to change this position has not been limited to occasional Zionist agression; it has reached considerable proportions, and for a quarter of a century has necessitated enormous expenditures for defense and armaments, which has without a doubt disadvantaged the economies of the Arab countries in general and the neighbors of the Zionist entity in particular.

Today, twenty five years later, after one of the neighbors of the Zionist entity (Egypt) has fought four wars with the enemy, in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973; a second (Syria) has fought three wars, in 1948, 1973; and a third (Jordan) has fought two, 1948 and 1967, the governments of these regions have declared themselves ready to recognize the Zionist entity on the conditions that the two resolutions voted by the Security Council in November, 1967 and October, 1973, be applied.

Naturally, we must weigh the importance of the effects of the June '67 agression; we know that last twenty five years have brought events and multiple transformations to the region and the world, we recognize the importance of the results of last month's war, and we are aware that the most recent resolution of the Security Council is not a resolution like those that preceded it, that it was voted on the initiative of the world's two super powers and has their guarantees.

Even though we are aware of all importance of all this, we cannot refrain from asking the following questions:

1. Do the governments in question think that their previous position was mistaken, and that it must now be modified?

2. Have new elements altered the balance of military

forces to our disadvantage so that the recognition of the Zionist entity has become inevitable?

3. Are the military, economic and other capacities of the Arab regions bordering on the Zionist entity and the countries that support them now inferior to what they were in the past, obliging the former governments to recognize the Zionist enemy?

4. Was the world situation more favorable to us in the previous stages of the conflict than it is now, and have we been driven to a choice between modifying our position and continuing to resist those who do not understand us?

5. Do the resolutions of the Security Council offer us advantages that we did not have in the past?

6. Are those who accept this new position convinced that it is just, or have they been forced, for avowed or secret reasons, to accept it?

We are not prepared to answer the first question, and we do not want to discuss it here. Besides, our manner of asking this question submits it to the judgement of the parties involved, the governments who have modified their attitude. It is up to them to answer it before the people of their respective countries and the Arab nation.

As for the other questions, although the governments mentioned above are certainly better qualified than we are to answer them precisely, we believe that they treat subjects which can be discussed without interfering in the rights or legitimate powers of any of the parties. In addition, this kind of debate falls under the category of freedom of discussion, to which every person and every group of people have the right. However, we will for our part try to limit our comments to points of no —or minimal— disagreement.

Concerning the second question:

On the purely military level (leaving aside the balance of power) all the indexes and official Arab information during the first phase of the war of 1948 tilted the scale towards the side of the enemy. In addition, it is common knowledge that the policy of «maintaining the military

balance of forces» in the Middle East which was followed by Great Britain and France and later adopted by the United States meant, for the colonial states who supported the Zionist entity, the necessity to strengthen this entity militarily, to make it stronger than all the neighboring Arab countries and any others that might take part in a war against it. If we are told that in the conflict with the enemy, the military situation at this moment is not in our favor (an opinion that we do not accept), we will not deny this, but state that the enemy has had such an advantage for a long time. We know this and have said it before; there is therefore no new element in the situation that forces us to change our position.

Concerning the third question:

We will not discuss the situation and the capabilities of the Arab regions bordering on the Zionist enemy for fear of making judgements that will provoke disagreement: we will only remark that officials in Egypt and Syria categorically affirm that the political, economic, military and social situations in their countries are better than they have ever been.

As concerns the situation in the Arab countries in general and in the countries that supported the belligerents in the last war, we would like to make the following points:

A. In 1956, Egypt fought alone against Israel, Great Britain and France; no other country actually participated in the war. In 1967, Egypt, Syria and Jordan fought together, but without any real aid from any other country. In 1973, the Iraqi army fought in the war alongside Egypt, and Syrian and Algerian, Morocan and Libyan troops. Saudian and Jordanian contingents also arrived at the front. (We shall not discuss the importance and the aim of their consignment). Finally, after the cease-fire, Kuwait sent military units.

Therefore, on the military level —in other words as regards the cooperation of Arab forces with the countries bordering on the Zionist entity— the attitude of the Arabs is more satisfactory than ever.

B. On the political and economic levels, Algeria, which was a French colony until the beginning of the sixties, when France went to war with Egypt in an attempt to crush the Algerian revolution, has become an independent state which used its political, military and economic capacities in support of Egypt and Syria in the last war. Libya was a state which played no effective role in the Arab world and served mostly as a British and American military base. Today, it is an independent state with no more foreign military bases, and it also supported Egypt and Syria in 1973. The Gulf countries, which had been British protectorates to this point and had never given any aid to the countries at war with the Zionist entity, sent Egypt and Syria financial aid both before and during the last war. Saudi Arabia did the same thing although we have a special conception of the role that this country played throughout the war. However, this is not the object of our analysis, for we want to present only information that will not provoke debate, especially among the governments in question.

In conclusion, we can state that the economic and political support given to Syria and Egypt by the Arabs is evidence of a more favorable stand than ever before.

C. The third point concerns the role of petroleum. We do have a particular and carefully defined conception of the way to use petroleum as a weapon and a special judgement of the measures taken in this regard during the last war. However, we will restrict our remarks to grounds that are undisputed by official Arab circles. These circles insist that the use and the manner of using petroleum during the last war worked in favor of the Arabs. We will cede them this point and say that this is another advantage for the Arab cause.

We may conclude that the situation of the Arabs and their attitude towards the countries at war with the Zionists (leaving aside our viewpoint and particular interpretation) are now, according to all official Arab circles, more satisfactory than ever! If this is the case, why have these governments modified their attitude and announced their intention to recognize the Zionist entity?

IV

We will answer the last two questions before the fourth one, for the analysis of the international situation and its impact on our problems has many ramifications and raises a number of points which we would prefer to examine later.

We believe that the outcome of the compromise desired by resolutions 242 and 338 will not be more satisfactory for the neighbors of the Zionist entity and the Arab region as a whole than the state of affairs on June 14, 1967. In fact, until that date, neither the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, nor the eastern part of Jesuralem were subjets of controversy and the Zionist entity did not take the risk of demanding any one of these territories before the international community, even though it counted on conquering all the Arab territories that it could.

Today, the texts of the two resolutions as well as the meetings planned and the declarations made after the June agression and even the October war, clearly show that there is an evolution towards territorial modifications to the detriment of lands placed under Egyptian, Syrian of Jordanian sovereignty on June 4 and which had never, to that point, been objects of international disagreement. This point, which we consider important, shows that the application of the two Security Council resolutions will produce a more grievous situation than

that of June 4, 1967, for the neighbors of the Zionist entity and the whole Arab region.

Some may object that the application of these two resolutions with a Soviet-American guarentee will prevent the Zionist entity from attacking the Arab countries again, and that even if we lose some territory, we will have made a tremendous gain, a «lasting» peace.

We have a number of remarks to make on this idea.

According to our conception of things, an entity such as the Zionist one, which has been implanted on the Arab land and imposed by force on the Arab nation with a very clearly defined aim: to keep our nation from unification, liberation and progress, can only be agressive and expansionist. If it ceases to be so —which seems very doubtful— on the one hand it would lose its principal *raison d'être* and on the other, it would no longer suit the needs of imperialism. Besides, we do not think that the Zionists and the imperialists would accept a compromise that would prevent this entity from practicing some sort of agression in the future and therby eliminating its *raison d'être* unless they are forced to do so. In this regard, the October war was not sufficiently coercive. This is why a lasting peace with this entity is impossible, even excluding for the moment the intentions of the neighboring Arab states.

The guarantees offered by the Soviet Union and the United States are certainly effective, but these guarantees are divided —those of the Soviet Union in favor of the Arabs and those of the Unites States in favor of the Zionist entity— and therefore their effectiveness will depend in practice on the nature of the alliances between the concerned parties in the region and the great powers. In fact, the Soviet Union can only guarantee a «lasting peace» in the region in favor of the Arabs on two conditions: first, that it maintains very close relations with the neighbors of the Zionist entity and second, that they ask it to do so. We would also like to ask the following question: What «guarantees» that the «compromise» in its present form will create future relations between the Soviet Union and the concerned govern-

ments such that the former will be able to assure peace in practice?

We do not want to anticipate, and we do not want to issue a categorical judgement on this subject. Nevertheless, to answer this question it suffices to go back to the not so distant past and look closely at what happened after October 22, 1973, and constinues to this day.

There is another question which we should keep in mind, especially since the regimes which have adopted the logic we are debating were at the height of power before June 5, 1967. If these governments and these parties considered the «peace» achieved by resolutions 242 and 338 advantageous and in accordance with the interests and aspirations of the Arab people, why didn't they try to obtain it before June 5, 1967? Why didn't they, at that moment, ask the Soviet Union and the United States to guarantee their borders, a «stable peace» and a «lasting reconciliation» with the Zionist entity?

Would this have been difficult or impossible? What would have made it so? Is it because the Arab people never have and never will change their position, or because the great powers were unwilling to take such a step?

We raise this point particularly since at that time, the regimes in question declared themselves the leaders of the Arab struggle for liberation, which was synonymous with the liberation of Palestine; they made speeches, shouted slogans, and one of them, Egypt, asked that the international forces which separated the two armies withdraw.

If these regimes consider what they accept today «wise», did the nation have to pay the exorbitant price of the two wars of June '67 and October '73 for this «wisdom»? No doubt someone can answer this question!

Some will say that the two Security Council resolutions guarentee the rights of the Palestinian people and that this is a new and important element which compensates for and justifies sacrifices made in other areas.

Everyone knows that resolution 242 does not mention

«the rights of the people of Palestine» but the «problem of refugees» In fact, the terms used in this regard are clear (cf article 12, paragraph B).

If the compromise included this kind of guarantee of the «rights of the people of Palestine» this would be nothing new, for basically, this does not contradict the resolution voted by the United Nations on December 11, 1948, which reads as follows:

«Refugees who wish to do so should be permitted to return to their homes as soon as possible to live in peace with their neighbors, and indemnities should be granted to compensate those who decide not to return for any property lost or damaged when, by the principles of international law or equity, this loss or damage, should be repaired by the governments or responsible authorities.»

Moreover, if the new resolution did not stipulate the repatriation of refugees, it would be worse than the old one.

Nevertheless, if matters are different, in other words in accordance with rumors and the information currently at our disposal, the rights of the Palestinians will be guaranteed by either the realisation of the project of King Hussein called «the united Arab kingdom» or the creation of a «Palestinian State» in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

We will not examine each of these projects, for we have already expressed our opinion of them, but we will ask the following question. If the creation of a Palestinian entity within the framework of the kingdom of Jordan or the creation of a Palestinian state in a territory including the West Band and the Gaza Strip means «the guarantee of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine», why didn't the Arab governments and the Palestinian political parties try to implement one of these projects before June 5, 1967, especially since the regimes in question were then in power?

Some may answer that King Hussein would have refused.

We will not deny this, we only want to point out that to fight King Hussein in order to implement one of these projets would have been far simpler and less costly than to fight two wars with the Zionist entity.

Without criticizing anyone, and without slighting the importance of the efforts to arrive at the two Security Council resolutions and the proposed compomise; no matter how hard we look, we cannot find any new element favorable to the Arab nation in either these resolution or the compromise based on them. The present stage does not differ from either earlier stages or the period preceding June 5, 1967, when the regimes in question (which are still in power) refused to recognize the Zionist entity and launched the rallying cries of «liberation» and occasionally, «the people's war of liberation» thus gaining prestige and support in the Arab land.

In regard to the sixth question:

It is up to the parties who accept the two resolutions, and them alone, to reply. We have nevertheless a few comments to make.

If the interested parties are absolutely convinced that what they have accepted is just, a sense of duty and simple loyalty demand that they state their opinion clearly, explain their motives, say what interests they believe are served by this acceptance, and define a far-reaching policy.

To this point, these parties have done nothing of the sort that is sufficient or convincing. The statements have been evasive and ambiguous and have resulted in a number of contradictory predictions. Even if the present situation allows such chatter, despite the fact that the October war is still fresh in our memory, the impending day of the meeting at «the round table of peace», as the news media calls it, will put the world in a situation where it will no longer be possible to avoid clear, direct and precise language.

If, on the other hand, the parties which accept the two resolutions are forced for some reason to take such a position, duty and loyalty oblige them to express their

views clearly, for the people in the countries involved have all the right in the world to know the opinions of their leaders and those responsible for their future.

One final word on this subject:

If these parties are truly forced to take this position, there will be no possibility of a «just and lasting peace» in this region. He who is forced to take a position will inevitably revolt one day. And even if he is quiet, the day will come when others will refuse the dictate, break the silence and pass to action. Experience and history have taught us this lesson.

V

On question n.º 4, which we have put off until now, we have the following remarks:

It is perhaps one of the sad truths of our age that for a long period of time, the rights of the Arabs in Palestine have only been supported by a few states, institutions and individuals of little influence. In 1947, the United Nations voted an unjust resolution stipulating the division of Palestine between its people and rightful owners on one hand the Zionists who invaded it with the help of British colonialists who ravaged it on the other. As soon as the Zionists proclaimed the creation of their state, «Israel», all of the great powers and the majority of the other countries in the world recognized it. For a long time, the Arabs (leaving aside a discussion of their social organization and the adequacy of their means of propaganda) found no one among the colonialists, the reactionaries, or even the partisans of liberty and socialism ready to listen to their grievances. The world saw the Palestinian cause as, at most, a case of «refugees» who deserved sympathy.

After 1948, the great powers, a large number of other countries, political institutions and the most influential news media took the side of the Zionist entity in different ways and obviously, with different motives and objectives, while the Arabs had only a few friends among uninfluential states and institutions.

Gradually, things have changed; the Arab liberation

movement has gained in size and strength, numerous countries have cast off the yoke of French and British imperialism, have come to play an increasingly important role in the struggle against colonialism and have started to find friends in Asia and Africa.

After 1955, friendly relations were established between the USSR and Egypt and soon after between this great power and other liberated Arab countries. The Arabs obtained arms from the Soviet Union after their governments' efforts to solicit them from the colonial states proved futile. Soviet Arab relations became closer and affected a number of vital domains, thus becoming a fundamental factor in the region and a source of support for the liberation movement's struggle against colonialism, Zionism and under-depelopment. These relations reached out to include all of the socialist countries.

The position of the Arabs in the world has improved over the years thanks to their political liberation and their economic and social progress. Even though Arab petroleum is controlled by colonial monopolies, it has assumed a role of considerable importance in international affairs, giving the Arab region an importance beyond its strategic position.

Without going into details, if we observe the world on the eve of and during the October war of 1973, we notice an incalculable difference.

First, the Arabs are no longer the colonized and feeble nation that they were in 1948, unable to find attentive ears for their grievances or partisans of their right to their usurped land. The Arab nation has been given great impetus during the last quarter of a century, it has taken great steps towards liberation and social and economic progress, and as the October war suggested, it now has enormous economic, military and political potential.

Secondly, the free Arab countries now have an important friend in the group formed by the USSR and the socialist countries which, by the criteria of force, is on an equal footing with the allies of the Zionist entity: the United States and the other imperialist states.

In addition, scores of Asian, African and Latin American countries have taken the side of the Arabs. The decisions made at the most recent congress of non-aligned countries and the initiatives taken by a number of African and Latin American states to break relations with the Zionist entity clearly demonstrate the strength of the support for the Arabs among this important group of nations.

As for Western Europe, which for a long time represented the greatest supporter of the Zionist entity in terms of political influence, military and material aid and news media, its position vis-a-vis the Arabs (we will not analyze the cause and motives of this attitude) is better than ever before.

As regards the people of Palestine, all progressive forces as well as certain Western states and circles no longer speak of the «refugee problem» but of the «problem of a people», their «aspirations», their «rights» and the «right to self determination», no matter what the formulas they use or what opinions they express. In comparison with the past, this constitutes inmense and radical progress.

On the other hand, the Zionist entity, which had the support of all the countries and influential organizations of the world, is now losing this support with every passing day, and it is presently going through a difficult —if not anguishing— stage.

Zionism is no longer pampered left and right as it was before. An ideological movement of a large number of progressive and honest forces in the world —including the Western world— has come into being, and it continually accuses Zionism of racism and nazism. Today, the states are suspicious of the Zionist entity, and try to check its far-reaching influence, specially in their most vulnerable points. On the other hand, the establishment of a «democratic state», one of the basic demands of certain Palestinian groups, meets with understanding and growing support throughout the world, even among groups who have never questioned the «right» of the Jews to build a «Jewish state» on Palestinian territory.

We can therefore conclude that the present international conjuncture is more favorable to the Arabs than ever, despite differences in our criteria or interpretations.

If the Arabs maintained (if only theoretically) their right to Palestine for such a long period of time and refused to recognize the Zionist entity when they were weak, isolated and incapable of explaining their cause to the world, is it «wise» for them to change their position and renounce their historic rights and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people at a time when they enjoy such great support in the world?

Many will object to this question by saying: «but the support for the Arabs at present is the result of the June agression. In order to maintain this support, we have to limit our demands to the elimination of its effects». This is true, for the June agression, by revealing the agressive and expansionist nature and policies of the Zionist entity, greatly influenced world opinion. However, this truth does not affect the question of recognition. On the contrary, the events that followed the June agression confirm our previously expressed opinions on the nature and intentions of this entity which will no longer find an audience. These events, far from weakening our position of refusing to support the Zionist entity, reinforce it.

Others will say: «But world support for the Arabs at this time does not go further than support for the demands to evacuate territories occupied in June 1967. Even our allies and friends do not agree with us on the liquidation of the Zionist entity». This reflexion is pertinent and correct, but we should add that our friends and allies as well as numerous groups who have adopted an objective and equitable attitude, associate evacuation with a guarantee of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It is our duty, if we are serious about defending our cause, to use this support to the maximum and to fight as all peoples have fought, with courage and dignity, to force the enemy to evacuate the Arab territorios occupied after June 5, 1967, without paying the price of recognition of the previous agression.

When we have reached the limit of these territories, the United Nations and the great powers will very probably ask us to stop and even threaten us with attack if we refuse. If we stop at this point, it will not be a withdrawal, capitulation or renunciation of rights; we will have been stopped by what is almost an ultimatum. No one will force us to recognize the Zionist entity, for we will have reached our position of before June 5, 1967, by strength, not by compromise. Then, and only then, will we have the position of strength and victory from which we can demand that the world guarantee the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

From this position, we can demand the rights of the Palestinians and take advantage of international changes, our own forces, the strategic position of our region, and the mighty weapon of petroleum. At this point we will truly be able to «grant and forbid», every forward step and every gain will be a sure and effective victory, allowing us to continue to struggle against the usurper.

Those who scoff at this «dream» should refer to the history of the Zionist movement and learn some lessons from the enemy itself.

When the Zionist entity was proclaimed on May 15, 1948, Ben Gourion refused to settle the international boundaries of the Jewish state although they were supposed to be those established by the United Nations during the partition of Palestine (which was decided on by the UN) in accordance with the current international logic. Ben Gourion refused any commitment that might have prevented the expansion of the Zionist entity; he accepted things as they were and awaited the opportunity to increase the amount of usurped territory. In effect, after the second truce, Zionist forces conquered new territories which became integral parts of «Israel». They then conquered and reached the frontiers of the eve of June 5, 1967, without ever settling the boundaries of the Jewish state. As in 1948, they left the situation deliberately ambiguous and the international community did not make a move for this simple reason: the enemy made its plans intelligently and

cleverly and executed them step by step, using detours and false retreats and putting its own forces, international fluctuations and alliances to their use.

The motto on the door of the Knesset reads: «The State of Israel, from the Nile to the Euphrates», and since its establishment, the Zionist entity has never ceased its efforts to conquer all the territories between the Nile and the Euphrates. Its ministers of foreign affairs and official representatives never mentioned this before their colleagues at the UN or international tribunes, but instead cried that «the security of the state of Israel» was a stake and that Arab agression knew no limits. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Zionist entity made ready for expansion towards the Nile and the Euphrates and prepared their «society» for the realization of their plan. On June 5, 1967, they occupied the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank, and international opinion was unable to make them return to their former boundaries. They stayed in these territories for nearly six and a half years, they colonized them, they tapped oil, and they invited tourists. World opinion was unable to contain them, for as Ben Gourion said, «our boundaries are where our army stops». The Zionists exploited their own strength, their alliances and their enemy's situation to the maximum and now that the October war has ended und the two super powers have decided to settle the so-called conflict, they demand guaranteed boundaries, and the world listens to them. If the compromise is achieved according to the current plan, they will be granted their demands. Can life teach us a greater lesson?

However, if the October war had continued and the Arab armies had arrived at the frontiers of before June 5, 1967; if the zealous Arab diplomats, always capable when it comes to compromise, had defended the rights of the Palestinians, would not the situation at present be different? We have our rights, and no matter what we do, we will not harm anyone or defy international law. Our acts only try to realise our just aspirations: to liberate our usurped land, to deliver our country from evil

and corruption and to rid the world of this tension which menaces world peace.

If, during this phase, the governments of the neighbors of the Zionist entity point out the effects of the June agression, the rights of the Palestinians, the nature of this entity and its expansionist and agressive policies, their action is realistic and perspicacious and we have no objection. However, this action must be part of a strategy of serious and constant struggle for liberation, not a search for compromise, for the enemy is solidly implanted in territories of these countries. The latter, «tactical» attitude will surely permit the enemy to obtain advantages through «compromise» that it did not have before June 5, 1967, and what is the most serious, reach the point where the governments in question recognise the legitimacy of either its past or recent usurpation. In such a case, the attitude of these governments will prove neither «tactical» nor «realistic».

Those who oppose our point of view would say: «How can we not recognize the Zionist entity with guaranteed boundaries when the international community has made recognition a clause of resolution 242, which also stipulates the retreat of the Zionists, and which we have recognized and tried in all ways to apply?»

We would answer that resolution 242 of the Security Council is not a faultless and inalterable document, humane and just, based on the values of human rights —if it were, it would be impossible and shameful to demand any modification of it. This resolution was voted on June 5, 1967, in the context of the defeat of the Arab governments and the Zionist military victory— it is therefore a consequence of this situation. If one examines it, one notices that it violates international law by ratifying territorial acquisitions —manu militari— to the detriment of those states whose territories are occupied even though these states are members of the United Nations, with recognized sovereignty and boundaries. Thus, the fundamental question is the «de facto» situation from which international organizations tried to legislate and find solutions.

If we had liberated the territories occupied in 1967 through struggle, could anyone have asked us to cede a portion so that the enemy would have guaranteed boundaries? We think not. If we had arrived at the frontiers of 1967 by battle and refusal to recognize the Zionist entity, and if we had based this refusal on the decisions of the UN which only officially recognized the boundaries fixed by the partition and voted a resolution allowing Palestinian refugees to return to their homes, what would the position of the UN have been?

We believe that this is not a matter of international pressure and resolutions of international organization, but above all a matter of a «de facto» situation, the result of an armed confrontation between us and the enemy.

This is the crux of the problem.

VI

We must now treat another aspect of the international situation: the so-called «entente between the super powers» and its effects on our cause.

What are the limits of this «policy of entente» between the Soviet Union and the United States? To what extent does it influence our cause? Can it really prevent us from continuing the liberation of our territories occupied after June 5 and demanding, from a position of strength, the rights of the Palestinian people?

The policy of «détente» (a term which we do not accept) represents an evolution of the policy of «peaceful coexistence» proposed in the fifties. This policy excludes war between the two camps as a means of settling differences and chooses negotiation and long term efforts to reach realistic and satisfactory solutions.

This is the inevitable consequence of two developments. First, the strength of the two super powers has made a war which would destroy both of them and the world impossible and second, American imperialism has lost all hope of seeing Eastern Europe move backwards, for despite the US's efforts, the socialist regimes have taken root and are making great economic progress and socialism has become irreversible.

The problems between the USSR and the US must be resolved directly and those between their European allies can only be resolved by negotiation and entente because a confrontation is dangerous, continual tension

is wearing and useless for both parties and finally, to leave problems unresolved would be senseless and injurious to both parties. This is the basis on which the two powers have decided to settle their own problems and those of their European allies. These powers have reached an equilibrium, and neither is capable of securing an advantage.

A large number of other lands in the world, including the Arab land, have not developed in a manner that permits these two powers to divide them among themselves and integrate them into their international system of defense. The political, social and economic developments in these countries have not reached a final or quasi-final stage, and one cannot exclude the possibility of conflict or competition between the super powers in their search for friends and allies. The ulterior motive of «détente» in these regions is to try to avoid at all cost any friction between the US and the USSR that would provoke a nuclear war and to peacefully settle the acute conflicts in the regions where they have friends or allies. However, this is only possible if local forces and circumstances permit, and each party has a definite vested interest. It goes without saying that each has its own position and point of view when it comes to finding a peaceful solution.

We believe that the so-called policy of détente cannot go beyong its own limits. Outside of these limits, there is a vast area where the super powers can secure advantages over their adversary, by force or other means.

In regions outside Europe, including the Arab land, the decisions and initiatives have been taken by local forces. The two great powers have only played complementary and supporting roles. In these areas, regimes have changed and been overthrown, wars have broken out and continued without the great powers being able to master the situation. (We will not discuss the losses or gains they incurred). The events of June 5, 1967, in the Arab land and of 1971, in the Indian subcontinent are the best proof of this fact.

When war broke out between India and Pakistan, the

United States could not intervene directly to protect its ally Pakistan. Because one of the belligerents —India— was in a position to win the war, Pakistan was divided and the new state of Bangladesh established. In June, 1967, when Egypt and Syria were attacked and their regimes rapidly defeated, the Soviet Union could not use its influence to stop the fighting at the limits reached by the Zionist forces.

For almost six and a half years, the USSR did its best to force the Zionists to withdraw, either by direct contact with the US or through international organizations. These efforts have been in vain —for only the Arabs are capable of carrying out this task and the USSR can only continue to give them economic, political and material support.

The so-called policy of détente only concerns our region in two ways: first, war between the US and the USSR must be avoided and second, the USSR can keep the Egyptian and Syrian regimes from falling to a Zionist invasion if they can resist for long enough, while the US can prevent the Zionist entity from crumbling before an Arab attack, if it can last long enough. Beyond this point, the field is open for local forces to do everything in their power and for the great powers to support their allies, without disturbing «détente» and provoking a third world war.

If we study the strategies adopted by the Arabs and the Zionist entity at different stages of their conflict, we notice that these strategies are within the field of action authorized by «détente». The Arabs, given their present capabilities and the prognosis on the world situation, do not include the military elimination of the Zionist entity in their current policy. The Zionists, for their part, are basically incapable of conquering Egypt and Syria at this time. Their objective until October, 1973, was to keep the territories they had occupied in June, 1967, because they needed a long period of time to annex, subjugate and integrate them.

Given this situation, each of the two parties, if determined and capable, can gain points by force or

political means without overstepping the limits of the policy of «détente». The Zionists did this on June 5, 1967, without any hesitation and in full awareness of international reality, without disturbing «détente» and without provoking a third world war. We did the same on October 6; we were successful at the beginning and we made important gains, but our regimes stopped short of their capacities and the limits of «détente».

Those who do not share our point of view will say: «But will our allies the Soviets, who are trying to maintain good relations with the US let us pursue the struggle and continue to aid us when they would prefer peaceful methods and disapprove of our desire to eliminate the Zionist entity, especially when initiative has been taken to reach a peaceful solutions, as on October 22?»

We must emphasize that we do not speak for the Soviet Union. It is assuredly our friend and ally, but must answer questions that concern it itself. However, we can discuss these questions in terms of our own information, interpretation and conception. This is our right, especially as this subject is vital to our destiny.

First, who was the first to call for a cease-fire during the October war: the USSR or the Arab neighbors of the Zionist entity? According to our information, it appears to have been the Arab governments. If our information is wrong, we hope to be corrected.

This is an important point, but we will not insist on it, for we believe that an objective study of the facts will lead to correct conclusions.

When Egypt and Syria were defeated militarily on June 5, 1967, the Soviet Union rearmed them. During the war of attrition the Soviet Union increased its military aid to these countries, installed launching pads and sent thousands of advisors and pilots to protect the airspace of these countries[1]. When the Egyptian government asked the USSR to withdraw its advisors, it did so,

1. Information provided by official Arab sources.Cf. the newspaper «Al-Moharrer».

and when Egypt and Syria decided to launch the war of October 6, 1973, the Soviet Union took their side, and established aerial and maritime supply lines to aid them militarily. Can anyone prove that the aid granted over a six year period was «calculated» so that the Arabs could only fight for 16-18 days?

Any political or military analysis of the Arab military forces amassed on the northern or eastern fronts will show no significant lack of arms, material or munitions, and it cannot be shown that the USSR did not want a long lasting war or hesitated to grant the military aid necessary to exert pressure and rapidly reach a compromise.

To our minds —and this is not just an interpretation— the Soviet Union could not have stopped military aid to the Arab governments if the latter had decided to continue the fight to the end, in other words, to the liberation of occupied territories in Egypt, Syria and Jordan, for the following reasons:

1. From the point of view of law: Egypt and Syria were fighting an occupying force on their own territory, which was internationally recognized as belonging to them, and which international law cannot prevent them from recovering. If the USSR had ceased to aid them is this liberation (which we believe inconceivable) it would have lost all credit in the eyes of the world as a nation which supports forces of liberation as well as its position vis-a-vis the Arabs which had been established over a twenty year period.

2. If one looks at the question in purely arithmetical terms and takes into account the amount of military and material aid that the USSR provided Egypt and Syria for nearly six and a half years (from June 1967 to October 6, 1973 and then during the war) can one logically think that it would have refused to give supplementary aid, especially as this aid would have given results? Is it logical to think that the USSR would have thus run the risk of having all its previous aid forgotten?

3. The Soviet Union is determined to avoid open conflict with the United Sates, but is certainly not

inclined to defend the United States' interests, influence and allies. Its immediate interest is to weaken the US and its allies militarily and economically in any region of the world to the greatest extent possible. Thus, in a conflict between the Arabs, allies of the Soviet Union and the Zionists, the local instruments of the United States, it is certainly in its interest to see the Zionist entity defeated. The Soviet Union knows very well that this entity is a military outpost of American interests and influence in the region, and that any weakening of the Zionist entity and consequently of American interest and influence will favor the Soviet Union. Thus, a victorious war against the Zionist entity does not run counter to the strategic interests of the USSR. The only problem for the policies of this power lies in crossing the frontier of June 5 to attack the Zionist enemy itself, for the Soviet Union does not accept this objetive and believes —with good reason— that an attack on the Zionist entity at this point would bring the direct intervention of the US and a possible confrontation between the two powers. This is something it wishes to avoid, and it is its right to do so.

When considering the Soviet Union's alleged responsibility for all the negative aspects of the conflict with the Zionist entity, we should remember that the Soviet Union was accused of being the cause of the situation called «neither war nor peace» and bear in mind everything that has been said about «offensive» and «defensive» arms. We must not forget that the October war proved that the decision of war or peace was the Arabs', not the Soviets', and that our weapons can be used either defensively or offensively depending on the will of our leaders.

In the final analysis, it is and will always be up to the Arabs, not the Soviets, to determine the length and extent of the battle. Experience has shown that the Arabs, not the Soviets, must take the initiative for war. This is not only logical, but has been confirmed by facts and experience.

VII

Those apposed to the opinion that we have just expressed would say: «Whether or not we arrived at the borders of June 5, the continuation of the war and, consequently, the possible defeat of the Zionist entity would never have been permitted by the United States. This power would have lost no time in deploying all its forces to support Israel —which it has already done— thus leaving us incapable of opposing it, unless the Soviet Union agreed to support us in exactly the same manner. Otherwise, discretion compels us to stop where we are and seek an acceptable compromise by peaceful means which would not have been possible before October 6».

Before discussing the position of the Soviet Union in this respect, we must first discuss that of the Arab regimes. We wonder, on the one hand, if they desire to intensify their struggle against the United States in response to the latter's increasing support of the Zionist enemy, and, on the other hand, if they are capable of it. Only after having examined these two questions is it legitimate to look at the Soviet attitudes. Indeed, it is neither fair, nor rational to neglect the position of those directly involved in order to concentrate solely in that of their friends.

Regarding the United States and their relations with the Zionist enemy, there are, in the Arab homeland, two opposing attitudes, «schools», or camps —it matters little what we call them —which, far from being limited

to this topic, actually touch many fundamental areas of Arab politics.

The first group holds that the USA and Israel each have their own perticular interests, whether concordant or contradictory, and that the United States can, therefore, either unconditionally take Israel's side, favor it to a lesser degree, or not support it at all. Among the several justifications for this opinion, the most important is the influence exerted by the Zionists on the United States government.

Those of the second opinion do not ignore the particularities and interests characteristic of the Zionist movement, nor its existence on the occupied territory. Moreover, they disregard neither the extraordinary influences on American institutions, nor the secondary contradictions that could arise between Israel and the United States. Nevertheless, in their eyes, the Zionist movement and the Zionist entity are tied to imperialism by a common destiny and, given that the USA is the foremost imperialist power, they are inevitably bound to it by this same destiny. After all, the USA needs a defender of its imperialist interests in the Arab region and was the Zionist entity not established for this reason? Without it, the United States would lack the coercive force to prevent the liberation, unification and advancement of the Arab people, as well as the eventual liquidation of American interests and total suppression of American influence in this area of serious strategic importance. Taking all this into account, the United States has no alternative but to unconditionally support Israel. The problem of how and at what levels the United States acts is another subject which must be examined in the light of the particular circumstances surrounding the alignment.

Given that these two positions are different, indeed contradictory, in their fundamental nature and objetives, their advocates have different approaches, likewise contradictory, to the question of American-Zionist relations.

With regard to this, the first group is subdivided into two «schools». The first claims to want to terminate these

relations: the Arabs should «cooperate» closely with the United States so that the latter «discovers and is assured» that its true interests lie with the Arabs and not with the Zionists. The advocates of this tactic have wasted their efforts in this direction, for the United States has not loosened its ties with Zionism. The second «school» (and one must remember that the two schools were united in preparation for the October war) believes that the United States has pushed its support for Israel since June 1967, to such an extent that it has proved embarassing for it. This group thinks it necessary to exert diverse forms of pressure on the United States while at the same time pursuing dialogue and cooperation in order either to reduce its support of Israel, force it to take a neutral position or perhaps even to win it over to the Arab cause.

The second group, whose attitude is opposed to that of the first, believes that the Arabs' struggle for total liberation, unity and progress must necessarily resist all forms of imperialism obove all American, while at the same time opposing the Zionist enemy. Although this struggle takes different forms and makes use of whatever means the circumstances require, one truth remains constant: the United States and Israel, inseparable allies, both remain on the opposing side.

These categories were established neither to accuse nor to injure anyone; however, in our oponion, the Arab regimes directly involved in the orientation of the conflict, since the defeat of June until now, belong to the first group.

Thus, the fundamental question is not the «entente» between the United States and the Soviet Union, but rather the «entente» between the Arab regimes in question and the United States. Some may believe that we are exaggerating in claiming the actual existence of a detente between these regimes and the United States, but no one will contest the fact that these countries have indeed attempted to achieve one. The sequence of Arab politics from the June defeat until the cease-fire, followed by the Rogers Plan and its consequences, will no doubt

confirm our words. Thus, it is necessary to examine, not the question of whether the Soviet Union is disposed to an «escalation» in response to that of the United States, but whether the regimes in question are themselves disposed to it. For this is the essential issue at hand.

The support that the United States grants Israel is not a new phenomenon. It could have been foreseen that the United States would use its full military, economic and political capability to prevent Israel from losing the war, for an Israeli defeat can only mean an American defeat as well. Those who planned the war should have taken this into consideration in their calculations and it seems that they claimed, time and again, to have done so before the war. No one would concede to them that the escalation of the United States' support was a «surprise». Thus, they should have planned an escalation on their part to counter-balance it. But did they plan ahead?! Did they permit others to? The American escalation was, in effect, a war against the Arabs. Now, common sense dictates that if the United States conducts an «effective» war against the Arabs, the latter must respond. Was the position of the Arab regimes regarding the United States the consequence of the Arabs' inability to confront them or the consequence of the earlier desire and decision to follow a policy of «entente» with this strong power?!

It is evident that the Arabs are incapable of «going to war» with the United States in the traditional sense; we are in agreement on this point. But they can, if they want to, attack the United States in other ways: first of all, by attacking Israel. After all, this state is essentially an advanced American base in our region and war against it is nothing more than a war against American imperialism, at least indirectly if not directly. This the Arabs would be capable of. Secondly, given that the United States has important interests in our region, i.e., petroleum interests, we can, in attacking these, do as much damage to this imperialist power as if we were to launch missiles on its cities. This is no exaggeration, but a fact which the Americans are certainly aware of, although the Arabs themselves are not fully conscious of it.

The Vietnamese people, whose military strength is much less significant than that of the Arab nation, were able to conduct a war against the United States for several years —at first indirectly but later directly —although they possessed only the will, ordinary weapons and the support of the socialist states. The Arabs possess, in addition to these factors, an important weapon whose effect could be serious and could extend to all regions and countries, not only the United States and the western world, if only the Arabs decided to put it to good use. And this weapon is petroleum!

A powerful leader of one of the Arab regimes in question said that the United States had entered the war on the side of Israel on the eleventh day of the conflict and that he had not wanted to confront this strong power.

Let us suppose, for the sake of discussion, that this is true and that the United States actually participated on Israel's side on the eleventh day alone —for we do not want to doubt this statement. Even if we do not attempt to discover what the Arab regimes would have done if the United States had «taken part» directly in the war on the side of Israel on October 6, 7 or 8, it is impossible not to wonder if the Arab military forces really were incapable of withstanding this degree of intervention for more than seven days! If this were the case, what day would the Vietnamese, for example, have been forced to stop fighting, considering that the United States had sent more than a half-million soldiers to attack them and had bombed them with more than ten times the volume of the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki? However, according to the information to which we have access, the day on which the cease-fire was declared, the state of the Arab military forces was good. No one, not even the enemies, had said that the Arab armies were incapable of resisting or of pursuing the battle.

Furthermore, did we even use the other weapon, that is, the «petroleum», in a way that could have actually placed us in a position to go to war with the United States or to prevent them from «conducting a war» against us?

The use of this weapon and its effects are constantly discussed today; the press considerably emphasizes the role of the «heroes» of petroleum. But what exactly happened in this area?

On October 7, 1973, Iraq decided to nationalize the American shares in the Basra Petroleum Company. The decision was purely political, aimed at opening the petroleum issue as another front in the battle against the enemy.

This state asked other Arab countries to liquidate the American interests in the area, as they themselves had done. Iraq insisted that if these countries did not want to inmediately undertake a similar action, they should, at least, place an inmediate embargo on petroleum destined for the United States and all states supporting the enemy and threaten to nationalize the petroleum interests of these countries if they sided with or supported Israel.

In our opinion, this is the only effective way to place the United States on its guard since the only reason this power supports Israel is in order to protect its strategic interests in the region. Now, if these interests were threatened with liquidation, the United States would have but a single alternative: to stop supporting Israel or to occupy the oil-fields. The second choice exposes the United States to three possible dangers: the destruction of these oil-fields, not unlikely in a state of war, open conflict with the Soviet Union and with all the forces of peace and liberation in the world and, finally, the overthrow and elimination of its agents all over the Arab world.

This seems to us to be the only effective method of preventing the United States from intensifying its support of our enemy or of bringing them to war if they refuse to renounce this support. This method is fully within our reach and we are perfectly capable of using it.

But did the Arab regimes use it when faced with such an attempt, in order to force the United States to renounce their support of the Zionists or, at least, to place them on their guard?

After Iraq nationalized the American shares in the

B.P.C., President Al Bakr sent two delegates to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and to the Gulf states in order to convince them to take energetic measures concerning the petroleum which would aid in the battle.

King Faisal's response was: «Do not discuss this subject, for I do not intend to mix petroleum with politics!» We were, at that time, in the first week of the war. Consequently, the government of Kuwait called an assembly of Arab petroleum ministers to prepare a common policy for the utilization of this new weapon. On October 15, the Egyptian government issued a memorandum to all petroleum producing Arab States in which it suggested that the volume of petroleum exported to the United States be reduced by 15%, to be followed by a similar reduction in the course of the following months, if this country insisted on maintaining its position. At the conference in Kuwait, convened October 17, the ministers decided to reduce the volume of production by 5% without taking any direct measures against the United States. When this resolution met with irony and surprise on the part of Arab opinion, the states concerned individually assumed the responsibility for decisions that would provide for a greater reduction in petroleum production and an embargo on petroleum sent to the United States. Among these states, Saudi Arabia, the largest petroleum producer, was the last to impose an embargo on exportation to the United States. Indeed, it came to this decision on October 20, that is, two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities or two days before the cease-fire. However, Saudi Arabia, it is well-known, has close relations with those who started the war, those who conducted it and those who declared the cease-fire.

These decisions certainly had an impact on the United States; nevertheless, they were not decisive, for they did not exert enough pressure on the United States to restrain its agressive policies. They most affected the countries of western Europe, where they were even harmful to some and continue to be. These measures, however, were not all carefully studied and some may

have fatal consquences for the Arab cause in Western Europe.

From these facts, we perceive that the Arab governments directly responsible for launching the war against the enemy do not, in principle, favor exerting strong pressure on the United States and, still less, «conducting a war» against it.

Those who advocate applying pressure —although feeble, if we refer to the facts— on the United States, while at the same time pursuing a dialogue with it in order to reduce its support of Israel, are the same who both triggered the conflict and put an end to it on October 22. They, as well, lost no time in showing their «good intentions» toward the United States in a way that could not help but attract attention, and to a degree that no one, not even the most pessimistic to the most optimistic of both sides, had foreseen.

Why, then, make the Soviet Union and its policy of «detente», assume the responsibility for the continuation of the fighting and the escalation of the war? Let us be frank and fair and recognise that it is not the policy of «detente» between the United States and the Soviet Union which stopped the war, but the policy of «detente» between the Arab regimes who started the conflit and the United States. Here is the truth... and here the problem!

These, in our opinion, are the only real answers to the six questions presented earlier.

We, for our part, find no logical justification for the declaration made by the Arab regimes which conducted the war, stating that they would be in favor of recognising the Zionist entity. Neither their internal situation —at least, according to them— nor the amount of aid and support that the Arabs squandered on them, nor even the international situation explains or necessitates such an attitude. Nor do we see, in the two resolutions accepted by the Security Council, such legitimate aspirations of the Arab nation as the «just and lasting peace» which is so often discussed.

Some will perhaps think that if we emphasize the question of the recognition of the Zionist entity, this

diminishes the importance of other aspects of the present situation and favors what appears to some to be a «purely judicial» question, although the conflict involves other urgent and serious aspects.

In reality, we have certainly not neglected these other aspects; they are, we believe, at the heart of our study. Moreover, if we have focused at the question of recognition, we have done so for two reasons: first of all, we do not want to dwell too long on subjets that could provoke disputes since we would rather let the actions and their results reveal themselves; secondly, this questions of recognition is of fundamental importance to us as Arabs and directly influences other major problems.

VIII

To recognise the Zionist entity is to clearly and frankly renounce the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the rights of the Arab nation to its own land. It would also mean the acceptance of a criminal usurpation unparalled in the history of humanity, regardless of the amount of land which one concedes to be usurped.

Nations which strongly aspire toward freedom and progress, as well as towards a coveted place among free nations, do not renounce their legitimate rights; on the contrary, they cling to these rights and fight to regain them if they lose them. In this way they win the right to exist and the respect of all peoples. We are not talking about a sentimental and romantic attitude, but about an actual fact and principle of justice which is fundamental in human life and in ancient and contemporary history, since nations, no matter what levels of power, wealth and progress they have reached, never give up a portion of their land, even if this is nothing more than untilled soil or arid desert. Such is the law of nations.

Palestine is neither an untilled land nor an arid desert. It is a land which was populated and full of life when the Zionists invaded it with the aid of British colonial forces. They established their entity by means of terror and force. They violently drove away the majority of the population. The other inhabitants, forced to submit to the authority of the Zionist entity, became third class citizens who suffer from all forms of persecution and racial discrimination.

It is painful to think that such a criminal act could

take place in the twentieth century, «the century of freedom and progress», and that it could be met with silence rather than resistance and disapproval. Worse still, reactionaries, progressives, colonialists and supporters of freedom, for once all united together, recognise it on the false and unfounded pretext of wanting to resolve the problem of the Jews who were persecuted by Europeans —as if it were right that the Arab people suffer the effects of the European persecution of the Jews, and that they pay the price for this by giving up their land and their right to live freely and peacefully. All this is taking place at a moment when the world understands perfectly the problem of the indigenous populations of Rhodesia and South Africa, when it disapproves of the usurpation of land and power in these countries by the white minority and when it opposes policies based on the persecution of natives and the practice of racial discrimination. We do not know how the world and, especially, the progressive international tendancies, would explain the glaring contradictions in the positions on these two problems which, however different in form, are basically identical. This defies understanding, especially since the Palestinian people were driven from their homeland by means of force and terror and since, given this, they have suffered a greater and crueller injustice.

In any case, even if the world has not yet taken a just and coherent position with regard to this human problem, there is no reason for the parties involved to accept as fact something which is neither human nor just. They must cling to their rights, struggle courageously to regain them and present their situation to the world in order to win friends and partisans for their cause, regardless of the effort and time necessary to reach this goal.

If Arabs recognise the Zionist entity, they recognise, by this act, the legitimacy of the usurpation of the lands and the dispersion of the Palestinians, their brothers in blood. So doing, they will forfeit one of the foundations on which rest freedom, dignity, and human progress. They will open the door to an even greater usurpation of their rights, to a new attack on their dignity and to

another act of agression against their freedom —and there are more than a few such usurpers and agressors who are only waiting for the right opportunity.

The recognition or non-recognition of the Zionist entity is not just a question of rights and legitimacy, but also an inextricable part of the present and future of the Arab nation and its struggle for freedom, unity and progress.

Looking at the realities of the Arab world, particularly in the course of the last twenty-five years, one can clearly see that the Zionist usurpation, with all that it represents in terms of glaring agression against the Arab nation, has invested our people with feelings of anger and violent opposition, first, toward the imperialist powers which have underwritten this agression and, second, toward the Arab reactionaries who, at one and the same time, have submitted to the imperialist forces and joined the camp of the agressor to whom they have surrendered.

In addition, the offensive of colonialism and the policies of the reactionary class have not failed to strengthen these feelings.

After the seizure of Palestine, the Arab struggle has acquired new and powerful incentives and reasons which have greatly contributed to weakening colonialism, casting aside a great number of earlier positions, and tearing away numerous former strongholds of the Arab reactionaries (who have pursued deceptive policies in order to appear to be on the side of the masses in the latter's opposition to the Zionist entity and in their firm commitment to struggle against it).

No matter what differences might exist among the progressive Arab forces regarding the national aspect of the Palestinian problem since this aspect is still a frequently discussed topic among these groups— no objective analysis can pass over the influence which this question exerts on the liberating struggle of the Arab people, since this question has always constituted a powerful incentive and aiding force in the struggle against imperialism and reaction.

The history of the Arab liberation movement shows, however, that these struggles did not mobilize the entire Arab nation in the way that the Algerian war of liberation and the response to the tripartite agression directed against Egypt in 1956 received the general support of the Arabs.

As for the struggle against the Zionist entity, it has always received massive popular support and unparalleled enthusiasm on the part of the entire Arab nation. At every encounter with the Zionist enemy, considerable forces converged, representing an enormous advantage for the liberation struggle against Zionism, and also against the imperialist and reactionary forces. At every stage the fighting revealed the intimate links between Zionism and imperialism, and the flagrant complicity in the latter on the part of the reactionaries.

Are not the vast and general support given the Palestine resistance by Arabe and the sacrifices for which Arab peoples, between the Atlantic and the Gulf, have shown themselves to be ready, proof enough?

The struggle for the liberation of Palestine in not at all a «national» struggle in the restrictive and traditional sense of the term. It is, and will remain, a national struggle of liberation marked by progressivism and democracy, directed against global imperialism and local reactionary forces.

That is why the recognition of the Zionist entity is not only a humiliating renunciation of the natural and legitimate rights of the Arab nation. At the same time it is a substantial impediment to the Arab struggle against imperialism and reaction, and an undermining of one of the keenest incentives it has nurtured during the last twenty-five years.

The intensification of the Arab struggle against the Zionist entity has always been linked to the effective progression of the Arab struggle against imperialism, and to the isolation of the reaction in the Arab political scene, whereas the immobilization of this struggle brings about completely opposite results which favor imperialism, the Arab reaction and the Right. In this regard,

the experience of the Arab struggle between June 1967, and October 1973, presents us with a wealth of valuable lessons.

Since 1967, the influence of American imperialism in the Arab region has aroused a violent anger which, as never before, constitutes a determining factor in the vast effective rebirth of the revolutionary, progressive struggle and which contributes to the realisation of many changes in numerous Arab countries, the most important of these being the revolution and founding of a progressive revolutionary and democratic regime in Iraq.

In the course of the war of attrition of 1970, the Arab struggle against imperialism developed, whereas the role of the reactionaries and the Right diminished. Thus, the progressive Arab forces, in particular, the Palestinian resistance, acquired strong positions.

But this liberation movement has also encountered great difficulties and suffered serious setbacks when the Egyptian government decided to call a cease-fire on the basis of the American promise to seek a solution to the «Middle-East Crisis», a promise known as «The Rogers Plan». This event engendered great differences, even among progressive Arab groups. In any case, from the time which immediately followed until the outbreak of the October war, the consequences confirmed that the suspension of the fighting and direct confrontation with the Zionist enemy brought about a dangerous and continuous development of movements hostile to Arab liberation and Arab-Soviet friendship: the progress of reactionary movements and the Right, partisans of imperialism and a worsening of the conspiratory role played by the reactionary Arab forces, in particular Saudi Arabia.

Given all these facts, an objective analysis can only come to this conclusion: the Arab regimes involved will throw themselves and all their forces into the arms of the Arab reaction and the Right... and into the arms of American imperialism.

The problem of compromise, stemming from that of the recognition of the Zionist entity, is not a question of

interpretation, nor is it an ambiguous question. Not only is it a problem of right and legitimacy, but a more important question directly and profoundly linked to the Arab struggle against imperialism and reaction.

If the regimes involved seek «détente» with the United States while they are at war with the Zionist enemy and while their cities are being attacked and their soldiers being killed with the aid of American weapons, what will they do when the war is over, when Israel is recognised; what will they do when inundated with Saudi and American influence?

In the name of right and legitimacy, and in the interest on the liberating and progressive Arab struggle, we condemn the recognition of the Zionist entity and alert the world to such a danger.

IX

No one wants to place an unbearable burden on the regimes surrounding the Zionist entity. In any case, there is a certain minimum which we cannot pass over, namely, the demands of nationalism, of Arab solidarity and of the objective realities emerging from the Arab and international situations. Without these considerations it is impossible to limit the question to the domain of the tolerable or intolerable or to that of legitimate interpretations.

It seems that these regimes are trying in every way to conceal their demands and all the justifications and objective realities, to throw themselves, with unique speed, in the direction of a goal they have given themselves, which they think they can attain. This goal is compromise.

This is the generalization we have drawn from this «compromise». No one could forget to ask this important question: can the «compromise» to wich these regimes aspire and for which they have done so much be realized? How? And when?

It was clear, even after the six and a half years of what we called political initiative, and even after numerous painful and complex attempts, that Israel would not be prepared to evacuate one inch of the Arab territories which it had occupied since the agression of 1967, if it were not forced to do so. It was also clear that America, in whom the Arab regimes had placed great hopes, was no more prepared to exert pressure on Israel to withdraw, if nothing in the region moved it to do so, whether

it wanted to or not. These two parties were quite satisfied with the occupation and worked in this framework to further their interests in the area.

At that the same time it was quite clear that, despite the agreement and compatibility of their interests and policies, ultimately and fundamentally imperialism and Zionism did not have the same understanding of the occupation and the goals envisioned by this situation: America saw the occupation as a winning card which it could use in its attempts to impose a form which fitted its strategic interests and desire to dominate the Arab region upon the regimes surrounding Israel. The Zionists see it as a goal in itself. It enlarges their territory and permits them to approach their strategic objective (the usurpation of all land extending from the Nile to the Euphrates) in addition to the military advantage which it gives them in their fight against the Arab nation.

If America had been satisfied with the situation of the occupied regimes and that of the region, it itself, would have taken the initiative toward finding a serious solution to the so-called Middle-East Crisis, more so even than the regimes in question, and made great efforts to reach such a solution. It is true that at the instigation of, and according to the plans of the imperialists, the reaction and the Right, many changes took place in these countries and in this region as a whole which pleased the Americans; but they were not yet completely satisfying nor reassuring. These regimes still contained preoccupying social forces, traditions, tendancies and policies whose elimination it demanded. Also, there were revolutionary pockets, in particular Iraq, in the region, which were troublesome and threatened to reveal and destroy its plans. This is why America has not moved quickly and seriously (as the above regimes wanted and as was promised them, here and there, by reactionary allies and advisors of the same type).

It was not possible to wait, since six years had gone by since the agression and occupation, and since the regimes who were still at the same point had to confront the questioning and profound anxiety of the masses, and

also the violent anger of the masses which indicated serious danger. Even the Arab reaction, which made efforts to temper these events while waiting for changes to take place in its interest and in that of the imperialists, finally declared that the situation was getting serious and that the checks in operation might loosen.

This was a dangerous impasse for which a solution at any price had to be found.

Not long ago, the involved regimes thought they had found a solution. But if we take a good look at the proposed «solution» and at the events which took place long ago, we cannot reject the view that this solution originated in an idea or tactic on the part of Saudi Arabia and that this country, proposing attractive terms, succeeded in convincing the involved regimes. Then, given American-Saudi relations, we cannot rule out the possibility of a certain relationship between America and this solution, which does not necessarily imply an accusation or suspicion of any group. It is hard, however, not to associate the diverse elements in question and to take the apparent realities into consideration. Let God judge their intentions!

The «solution» reached by these regimes is the necessity of a «thawing» of the affair which has remained obstructed since 1970. In order that this «thawing» render the desired results, there must be a strong agreement and it must be totally different than the earlier attempts. It is no less true, however, that in the foundation, execution and ultimate purpose of the operation, it is a «thawing». This execution is a military struggle against the Zionist occupation which would be, at one and the same time, large in scope and short in duration, since it would emerge in the meantime from new circumstances which would push the Americans to act quickly on behalf of the awaited compromise. By the same token, all the parties involved would have found reasons which would seem sufficient to endorse a compromise and to overcome this disastrous obstruction.

Also, for this «thawing» operation to achieve its goals,

it was necessary to take certain questions into consideration, namely:

1. For the Arab masses and people, it had to represent a war of liberation, since the masses do not understand the «thawing» mechanism in the same way that political veterans do, nor do they have much enthusiasm for it. This operation had to limit itself to outward appearances, without taking into account the deeper meaning or the fundamental criteria of the war of liberation, since the goal in mind is to win over public opinion in order to consolidate the power bases of those who sought the compromise.

2. From the military point of view: it was necessary to have certain attitudes since, by means of armed fighting, it was possible to gain better positions and to take advantage of them in the negociations without inciting a reaction on the part of the enemy which might bring about a new defeat.

3. The deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union had to be improved in order to take advantage of the international position and influence of this power and to facilitate the compromise. This was also necessary in order to obtain the necessary arms for the struggle from this power, after the attempts to obtain them from Western Europe had failed. In any case, the «improvement» should not go beyond the limits which might worry and invite America, since it would not undertake the role which the compromise demanded of it.

4. In the Arab context: the agreement, acceptance or silence of the greatest possible number of Arab governments had to be obtained. Those who disagreed or were silent would be subjected to accusations and defamation -an embarassing situation— in order that they might not serve to hinder the plan or obstruct the work of this operation. Arab participation was necessary for realistic reasons, but it had to be limited and carefully watched in order not to constitute, definitively, a hindrance for those charged with the preparation of the compromise.

5. Concerning the Palestinians: it was indispensable to surround the resistance in order to prevent it from

being a liberating force, without completely eradicating it. In this way, it could be used to the advantage of the compromise while remaining harmless and not very cumbersome.

6. It was also necessary to take petroleum into consideration and to make an implement of «reserve» that would be possible to use in some way or another to exert pressure in certain cases and, in cases of necessity, in order to aid the work of the compromise.

Such were the «solution» and its measures.

The veterans who prepared this thought they had elaborated an ingenious plan, of the vastest and most efective dimensions, containing all elements necessary for a «thawing». They thought that, working from this, they were assured of success.

But the veterans who deal with these historical and national problems, who think of this as proof of their genius, always forget fundamental realities, no matter what they do, and demonstrate that in looking for the way out of an impasse, they encounter another one. The historical problems and important questions in reference to the destiny of a nation cannot be resolved by these sorts of solutions, but by serious, determined, and relentless work founded on necessity and justice.

These veterans have forgotten the following truths and questions:

1. The people to whom one says that their struggle is a struggle of liberation, and who discover later that it is a question of «thawing», will not remain calm and quiet. The people will not cease to question and to discuss and when they discover the truth, they will not limit themselves to discussion and questions.

2. The elements in the army who fought the battle on a large scale have faced the danger of fighting and death. In the field of battle, soldiers and officers prefer to die for liberation rather than «thawing». Also, when they see that they have exposed themselves to a thousand dangers only to release the tension of an argument, they will take an attitude which will certainly not concur with the reckonings of the tacticians.

3. Any great endeavour has foreseeable results. Also, we cannot exclude the possibility of unforeseen and accidental, indeed inevitable results most of the time. In an action of this sort, something accidental can become serious,surpassing what had been anticipated in its importance and gravity.

4. If the Arab regimes are seeking to save face in this compromise, the group in power in Israel will not permit anyone to humiliate them in front of the Israelis. In fact, given that since its origin the Zionist entity has been founded on the principle that it is invincible and capable of defeating the Arabs, and that the abandoning of this principle would create a gap in its base, it is possible that the group in power —if it is not totally defeated— would return to all the pretexts which, in the compromise, would give it greater advantages over the enemy.

5. No matter what it says concerning peace and «secure borders», the Zionist entity will not agree to «definitive borders» until it suffers a defeat. A categorical and definitive limitation of borders runs totally against the Zionist idea and calling which rest on the creation of a state between the Nile and the Euphrates.

Today, more than a quarter-century after the creation of this entity, and after the acquisition of all the advantages gained from the agression of June, 1967, it is completely foreseeable that the Zionists would do anything that would permit them to obtain, by means of a compromise —if it were realised— fundamental territorial advantages, and to create a state of confusion while waiting for different circumstances and new opportunities favorable to the expansion of this entity.

In the light of events which have taken place since October 6, it seems clear that all that the veterans, who have «fabricated» this ingenious «solution», did not foresee or calculate, has taken place, producing its material and moral effects on a real situation and on present events and events to come. These effects are the complete opposite of the plans and illusions of those wo defend the political «solution».

X

The Arab soldier who was humiliated in June 1967, and who was not, at that time, authorized by the political and military leaders to prove his courage, his combativeness and his determination to sacrifice himself for his cause, did not behave in 1973, according to the rules of the «thawing» war that his superiors had planned. This war, instead, gave him the historic opportunity to display his nobility, his capability and his courage. He fought to the death, reversing the strategic relationship to a greater extent than either the enemy or the «veterans» of the tactics of the war had foreseen.

In addition, these «veterans», today on their way to a compromise, can no longer tell him that he was defeated, for he was not and he certainly knows it. They cannot tell him that the victory accorded to him was sufficient, for he knows, as well, that he did not achieve the victory to which he and his people aspired.

The Arab citizen who aspires, with strong determination, to freedom and dignity, awaits only the historic opportunity to realise the hopes that he cherishes. When the war broke out, even those who did not have much faith in him were surprised to find that he did not run away, panic-stricken, to the shelters, during the enemy raids on the towns, but that, instead, from high on the terraces, he counted with delight the number of enemy planes shot down. They were also surprised to discover that, far from complaining about the shortages of meat,

rice and fava beans, he gave more to the cause of the war than was asked of him.

When the war ended, the «veterans» were unable to tell him that he had not given, for he had, and without stinting. They were equally unable to tell him, «Look, here is the compensation for your sacrifice», for they had achieved nothing that could satisfy and reassure him.

We hope that the evocation of Iraq's role will not be regarded as ostentatious, but as a reminder of facts which the nation has a right to know and which we, due to our loyalty, feel we must mention.

We are not alluding to anyone in particular in saying that «the veterans» who planned the settlement had foreseen a different situation and role for Iraq than those it actually encountered, as well as results other than those now achieved.

It was well-known that Iraq suffered from two serious disorders: its strained relations with Iran and its internal situation resulting from the precariousness of the conciliatory, democratic solution to the Kurdish question. It was believed that these two problems would absolutely prevent Iraq from playing an effective role in the broader realm of Arab politics.

No doubt, many of the parties involved in the «solution» in question would have preferred to ignore these two problems, allowing them to worsen. We have several testimonies and strong evidence to prove this.

Furthermore, these parties did all they could to isolate Iraq and to stifle or distort its projects, propositions and ideas concerning the national struggle. Some of them even conducted campaigns against Iraq aimed at prejudicing its ideas and actions and angering it in order to remove it from the scene. Some may remember that the government of a fellow Arab country conducted a vile campaign of insults and accusations against Iraq two weeks before the October war, a time when this country was supposed to be preparing for combat and when it was obvious that Iraq's participation on its side was necessary.

Several parties doubtlessly wanted, in the event of a

war, to prevent the participation of Iraq, or, at least, to keep it to a minimum, so that it would have neither an important role in the battle, nor a voice in the destiny of the region. Some if them may have wished that this regime be, in some way or another, carried away by the current in order to lighten the burden of the «veterans» and of their masters, the imperialists, by the removal of this revolutionary hotbed. But, far from resigning itself to silence when confronted with these antinationalist tactics and underhanded dealings, this regime confronts and exposes them and emerges energetically in the middle of the action.

Those who were responsible, in whole or in part, for these wrongs do not know how true revolutionaries act nor what forces they draw from.

In spite of all the problems and dangers which threaten Iraq and which the old tacticians thought would effectively impede its participation, this country is directed by a revolution and a revolutionary, nationalist and popular party in which both patriotic forces and progressive nationalism are intimately united. Thanks to these questions, Iraq possesses reserve forces allowing it always to meet its needs with the greatest zeal and to the greatest extent, without fearing the dangers. For in accomplishing this task, in surmounting all hardships and in taking the lead, the revolution in strengthened.

Despite all that these «veterans» did to isolate Iraq and to force it to renounce, in a fit of anger, its participation in the battle, they, did not realise the fact that, in a decisive moment, the vanguard forces in history are not moved by anger or by uncontrolled reactions, but by a sense of historical responsibility. They are conscious, above all, of their mission and disregard what others think and do.

Although the heavy and effective participation of Iraq was not anticipated (and was, no doubt, undesired by some), the developments of the war, from the first few days, made it a very important and very necessary element, something that the advocates of the «solution» had not foreseen.

Thus, among the regimes that rejected the compromise, the one that cried out loudest its refusal was neither isolated nor stifled. It was not carried away by the current as some had hoped; on the contrary, it left the battle with more vigour and courage and with an even greater capability to continue its march.

This, then, is what happened in the camp where the people and the revolution are united.

In the opposing camp, the imperialist and Zionist forces found that, despite the nature of the «thawing» plan and despite their limited objectives and horizons, the war had become an extremely important reality in the region. At the moment when the Arab soldier —the Arab citizen— and the Arab revolutionary forces entered the battle in force, the enemy nearly lost control of the situation. On the petroleum «front», one of the most important in the war, the control was no longer in the hands of America's friends nor in those of its allies in the region who were so strongly opposed to the introduction of petroleum in politics. In fact, since Iraq had nationalized the American shares in the petroleum company of Basra, and in view of the intensity of the struggles and the popular outcry demanding the utilisation of petroleum as a weapon, these friends and allies of the United States were forced to rapidly take positions as «petroleum producers» which had not figured in their plans nor in those of those of imperialism.

Then, in the course of the war, the enemy front —and that of imperialism— was shaken and the entire worl was convinced that it was witnessing a crucial event.

This was an important acquisition for the Arabs and a historic advancement for their cause. Nevertheless, even if this constituted the path that led to compromise, the forces of imperialism and Zionism did not easily tolerate it. That is why it was completely foreseable —after they had ascertained that the situation in the area had changed, becoming explosive, and that it was indispensable to put into operation the long-awaited compromise— that they would try, by all means, to divert the course of events in the direction that they favored.

Each one of them, then, had to act according to the circumstances and according to its abilities. The Zionist enemy, for its part, incapable of achieving the decisive victory that it had anticipated and that it had been promised at the beginning of the war, urgently needed to score a military victory of a «particular nature» even if it were neither total nor decisive.

This need was both tactical and strategic. From the tactical point of view, the enemy could only undertake the process of «compromise» in the hope of achieving its goals, if it were defeated, even only partially, for this situation would give an obvious material and moral advantage to its adversary. Thus, unable to gain a decisive victory in the course of the war, it was absolutely necessary to achieve some kind of «equilibrium» in the shape of a new situation. In reality, however, the enemy knew very well that there would never be a true «equilibrium» between it and its adversary, but rather a situation which would practically tip the balance to its side, considering it already had one important advantage: its presence on the occupied territories since 1967.

From the strategic point of view, this need is tied to the very essence of the Zionist entity and its theory, both of which are based on the creation of an entity that will always be stronger than the Arab nation and always capable of defeating it. That is why any defeat, even partial, would reverse its historical course from the «ascent» it has known for the part twenty-five years, to a «decline» of unpredictable duration.

In the course of the war, we ascertained that the enemy was attempting to gain this «apparent victory» whatever the price.

During the first few days, the enemy was bent on achieving this victory on the Syrian front; it concentrated its forces and persisted feverishly for several days in trying to occupy Damascus, where they received a crushing military defeat. We for our part, were conscious of it at time and wrote un article on the subject for the daily, «Ath-Thawra». The enemy knew that the occupation of Damascus would not constitute a decisive

and total victory if the war were to be continued and the field of battle were extended to all Arab territories thus mobilizing the entire Arab potential. But the occupation had represented en «apparent victory» for the enemy, to be used both for its tactical ends in the form of a «compromise», which it knew the Arab regimes desired, and for the strategic ends which we have mentioned.

But the Iraqi forces, which arrived rapidly at the front and which fought with remarkable determination, contributed, due to the decisive historical role which they played, in preventing the enemy from achieving its goal: the occupation of Damascus. We are not bragging, for this is an indisputable fact that our enemies will recognise even before our friends will.

After several days of bloody fighting, the enemy undoubtedly ascertained that the victory it desired was no longer possible on the northern front and thus turned toward the eastern front, planning to penetrate to the eastern shore of the Suez Canal.

It is truly regrettable that the enemy was allowed to achieve this objective.

We do not intend to condemn or blame anyone here. The day will come when we will discover the truth of what happened, as well as who was responsible for the events and subsequent developments, some of which are already apparent and striking despite the attempts, which we consider futile and erroneous, to reduce their significance. Nevertheless, despite our profound sincerity and devotion, we will never understand how a political and military authority which undertook, with a large military force, the crossing of the canal and the destruction of the «Barlev» Line, could not make the necessary arrangements to prevent the enemy from reaching its goal or, at least, to resist the attempt. Besides, such an effort was even more essential for the realization of the «thawing» strategy than it would have been for a war of liberation. Since a short war with stunning results was desired and planned, common military and political sense should have necessitated the preservation, at all costs, of the acquired positions.

The political and military command in Iraq, which is geographically thousands of miles from the field of battle on the western front, was conscious from the very beginning of the seriousness of the goal which the enemy sought in its penetration eastward.

When information was received which revealed the enemy's attempt to penetrate to the canal, Iraq's political and military command forcefully attracted attention to the gravity of the situation and advised the parties involved to give this problem complete military priority and use every possible means to foil the attempt.

According to information which we have at our disposal, the Soviet Union, as well, was put on its guard against the consequences of the Zionist endeavour.

The United States, for its part, had a role, a task and objectives that were quite different.

The United States was not opposed, in principle, to a compromise, but it wanted one concordant with its strategic interests and policy in the region.

The United States knew that the regimes involved had been trying for a long time to place it at the base of this compromise and that they were willing to make concessions to achieve this. Therefore, the timing of the application of this compromise depended on the United States.

The situation in the region had become so serious that the United States took a fundamental interest in initiating the negotiations, for this region, with all the strategic interests it represented, could have revolted against it, with or without the assent of the existing regimes.

Futhermore, the Zionist enemy, its ally, was able to gain, in the course of the battle, the «apparent victory» that it desired.

Thus, the United States acted in order to stem the revolt and to guide the events in the direction it favored. It was natural that the United States would direct its policies and actions in a way which suited its interests. What was not foreseeable, however, even taking into account the logic of any «compromise» and of any

«thawing» war, was that the regimes would reveal all their cards at once to the United States. It had only to point toward the «solution» and toward the compromise for the regimes to behave as if the solution were already a reality.

The cease-fire was settled without hesitation. The enemy was given free rein to exploit the operation of «penetration» to the maximum. Kissinger was greeted more warmly than a brother or a friend. Relations with Washington were renewed with incredible rapidity although the keynote policy of the boycott of the United States and all its interests in the region was still brandished with force. The Soviet Union was practically excluded from all important contacts, as if its role had ended and it were no longer needed. Still, many justified this, saying that the compromise was now «guaranteed» and that it was only a matter of working out the details of an agreement whose goal would be to «consolidate» the cease-fire under the sponsorship and direction of the Unites States!! And this agreement would be none other than the «six-point Kissinger accord»!!

Even this accord, despite the differences of opinion, was transformed by American and Israeli propaganda into an extremely important operation, deserving assemblies and crises. As for the question which was fundamental in the eyes of those working for the «solution», that is, the question of the occupied territories, this disappeared almost completely to make room for discussions of such issues as the lines occupied by the Arab and the enemy armed forces on October 22.

Kissinger then left the region to pursue other affairs, but not before he had paved the way toward a «compromise». His statement, «America needs a period of time varying from six months to a year to be able to undertake anything reasonable», reported by the Egyptian daily, «Al Ahran», without a doubt reveals that the American and Israeli strategy consists purely of putting off the regimes and leading them astray with useless chatter.

The United States obtained a great deal of what it

wanted, indeed, much more than it had hoped. In addition, the enemy won the «apparent victory» which it had longed for. But the Arab regimes involved went away empty-handed.

It would perhaps be usuful to recall what we said to our Arab brothers in the course of direct discussions held in the Arab assemblies and particularly at the time of the meeting of the communal Arab defense council: «Granted that you are in a position to pursue only the goal which you have temporarily outlined, that is, 'the liberation of the territories occupied in June 1967', it is logical that, to achieve this, you must first define a strategic objective and prepare for it with all necessary means. But if the temporary goal is defined as the limit of all these aspirations and preparations, everything realised will remain well within the visualized goal».

And that is exactly what happened. The «thawing» war and the idea of «thawing» can achieve nothing more, no matter how divergent opinions may be concerning the details.

Therefore, we can legitimately ask ourselves where a compromise can lead under such circumstances.

XI

The war of «thawing» certainly achieved its goal in the sense that it oponed up the situation; this is undeniable. Nevertheless, the «thawing» of relations did not constitute an end in itself, but rather the road leading to the compromise, desired and sought by certain regimes.

Now, the «compromise» —like any compromise, moreover— cannot be known, defined and prepared in advance. It is not enough that the parties concerned demonstrate their intention of using this recourse in order to see it realised. It is an operation of extreme difficulty and complexity whose execution and final form take numerous factors into consideration, e.g., the particularities of the two parties and the relations of their forces, as well as other objective factors in the region and in the world. Furthermore, the logic of «compromise» essentially demands reciprocal concessions from both sides.

There undeniably exist in the current state of affairs certain factors which facilitate the «compromise», but there are numerous others which, far from facilitating an agreement, make it extremely difficult, if not impossible:

1. The manner in which the regimes prepared for the last war, the horizons they visualized and the behavior they assumed during the fighting, as well as their acceptance of the cease-fire and finally, their resulting attitude, are all reasons which led the military situation to a kind of «equilibrium» between them and the enemy,

taking into consideration the new circumstances.

The war produced new truths and a new situation which had a fundamental importance for the Arabs; however, this situation was effective only during the fighting. In our opinion, the declaration of the cease-fire and its maintenance, as well as other delays, procrastination and the examination of a thousand useless details, which accompany the compromise now and which will most likely accompany it in the future, will progressively weaken the positive effects of the war, little by little restoring pre-war conditions.

Furthermore, even if, at the end of the interminable negotiations, there was an improvement over the situation which prevailed before the war, the importance and impact of this positive factor produced by the fighting was considerably diminished. This is why the results, clearly in favor of the Arabs during the war, will be transformed after the cease-fire into a situation which not be completely favorable to them. In the process of negotiating the compromise, the Arab regimes will lose the important and effective advantage which they thought was theirs through the «thawing» strategy. In addition, the «penetration» wich the enemy achieved and which enabled it to exploit its advantage to the utmost after the war, shifted the center of the negotiations on the compromise from the enemy camp to that of the Arab regimes. In other words, instead of inmediately and forcefully launching into a study of the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories of 1967, thus drawing from the positive results of the war, the regimes today waste their time and efforts and exhaust their nerves in a debate concerning the lines of October 22, 1973, and other problems raised by the most recent war.

Despite the efforts of some to reduce the negative effects of the shift from the debates on the question fundamental to the Arab regimes (that concerning the territories occupied in 1967) to that of the results of the October war —debates which threaten to last indefinitely and which present numerous complications— no one

can deny that the compromise has a negative impact on the position of the Arab regimes while strengthening that of the enemy.

2. After the cease-fire, since their military advantage was practically eliminated, the Arab regimes had only «the weapon of petroleum» to resort to.

It is well known that in this last domain the power of decision was not in the hands of the regimes neighboring the Zionist entity which themselves possessed the military influence, but in those of other regimes considered to be friends of the United States, if not its partisans. It is useful to point out that the regimes neighboring the Zionist entity, by openly taking positions vis-a-vis Iraq and its role in the total problem and in the petroleum question, while obviously ignoring the role of Libya, act as if they preferred the power of decision to be entirely in the hand of Saudi Arabia. One can logically deduce from this that it is the friends of the United States, led by Saudi Arabia, who will have the final word concerning the events and who will direct them toward a «compromise» favoring their interests and views. This directly concerns the Arab liberation movement and the internal situation of the regimes neighboring the Zionist entity. The regimes will be faced not only with the fact that, in the framework of the «compromise», their power to negotiate with the enemy and with the United States will be weakened and rendered almost insignificant. They will also find that an essential share of the power is not in their hands at all, but in those of reactionary regimes which are friends of the United States. They will see that Saudi Arabia, as well as other «petroleum producers» friendly with the United States, who are now in control of the power of decision, will not fail to profit from this historical occasion by taking positions that appear «firmer» than those of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes, considered as members of the Arab liberation movement. This means that the moral «weight» which these two regimes carry in the Arab world will be transferred to the Saudi regime and its allies. If we analyse in detail Kissinger's visit to the region, taking into consideration

the reports in the press, including the words of the Secretary of State reported in the daily «Al Ahram», which suggested that King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was reinforcing his position, we perceive that the general orientation represents the Egyptian regime as «soft» and the Saudi regime as «firm». Naturally, the Saudi «firmness» is only a manoeuvre, or worse still, a reactionary American plot directed at reinforcing the reactionary camp to the detriment of the liberating forces of which the Egyptian and Syrian regimes are supposedly members. The final results now in effect are evidence that the expected «compromise» will become possible only on the condition that it adhere more closely to the plans and conceptions of the reactionary regimes allied with the United States than to the spirit of those directly involved with the «cause». In our opinion, it is not easy for the regimes which have long been in the ranks of the Arab liberation movement and whose existence and influence in the region rested fundamentally in this position, to accept this kind of «compromise» even if it were advocated by their highest leaders.

3. Even if we exclude a thorough analysis of the expansionist nature of the Zionist entity (although this nature is deeply rooted in and impossible to dissociate from Zionism), even if we disregard the consequences of this attitude, e.g., the insistence of the enemy to hold on to the largest possible portion of the territories that they have occupied since 1967, and look at the question through the eyes of those who debate with the enemy over the alleged theory concerning the «security of Israel», who attempt to «persuade» it that this theory is unfounded since its «security» can only be assured through peace with its neighbors, we find no indication that the Zionists would be convinced by the advice of certain «sensible» Arabs or foreigners. On the contrary, they continue to emphasize that their security can only be assured by the safeguard of all the occupied land, or of certain essential portions, and not by international guarantees.

In spite of the influence of the war on the Zionist

entity, an influence which was progressively weakened by the cease-fire, the policies of the Arab regimes and all the other factors that are advisable to mention, the new position has not yet produced results sufficient to force the enemy to change its theories and policies, that is, to agree to a total evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967.

Given this situation, in addition to the logic behind any «compromise», the expected result is that each of the two parties make concessions that will satisfy the other.

For the enemy, the concessions mean the evacuation of land occupied since 1967, which is totally subject to the sovereignty of Egypt, Syria and Jordan; whereas, for the countries surrounding the Zionist entity, they mean the surrender of a part of their own territory to the benefit of the enemy!!

In addition, given the present situation and available information, how can the outline of these «concessions» be defined?

The enemy has demonstrated a kind of «flexibility» concerning the evacuation of the Sinai during the last few years. But it is useless to interpret this «flexibility», particularly after observing its behavior and reasoning, to mean that the enemy would pull out of a certain part of the Sinai while keeping the rest, whether it be large or small.

Since the Arab regimes refuse to surrender all to the enemy, it is inevitable that they face the problem of a «concession» of some portion of their Egyptian territory. But are they capable of this?

Although they may reach some agreement concerning the Sinai, the Syrian plateau presents quite another problem, for until now, the enemy has never demonstrated any «flexibility», even in words, regarding the evacuation of this strategically important plateau. Even if the enemy were forced to show a certain «flexibility» here, as well, we predict that this would not go beyond dividing the plateau with the Syrian government and placing a part of the territory under international domination of some form or another. This implies

«conceding» to the enemy a part of the Syrian homeland, whether it is accomplished through «internationalization» or «division». But what Arab would be in a position to accept such an endeavour?

If some consider what we have said to be impossible, we wonder how the regimes in question are capable of facing the people and the armies of their countries —not to mention the Arab nation as a whole— in order to convince them that the results achieved in the negotiations authorize them to remain in power and to continue to rule their countries. How can they make this claim? And at what price? We certainly do not know, nor do we believe that they themselves know!

4. These regimes are building up hope that American pressure may force the enemy to retreat from the territories conquered in 1967. Even if, for the sake of discussion, we agree to the reasoning of America's friends and of those who take its side in the compromise and admit that it is completely serious in what it undertakes, we cannot, practically speaking, expect it to shift suddenly from an attitude it has held for more than six years, an attitude of tacit approval regarding the Zionist occupation, to a totally contradictory attitude: exhorting the enemy to evacuate «all» the occupied territories.

Thus, a change of attitude on the part of the United States, disregarding other conjectures and interpretations, can only be as decisive as certain people want it to be. This means, naturally, that in spite of all the concessions and efforts they have made to satisfy the United States, the Arab regimes in question will still be faced with the problem of the «surrender» of some part of their national soil, whether Egyptian, Syrian or of the West Bank, to the benefit of the enemy!

In addition, this change of attitude —which involves the limits we have mentioned— cannot take place without opposition, for the United States will certainly not act solely for the sake of these regimes. We are not here concerned with the «price» that it would demand, for this is a well known and even public affair, especially

since the control of the power in the region is passing from the hands of those first involved, now considered «soft», to those of the Saudi king, allegedly «firm», who controls the «big bank».

If some think the United States will try to sell all of the occupied territories, we can only wonder how exorbitant the price will be! And who among the principal members of the cause would be capable of paying it?

Another problem which makes this attitude even more complex is the situation of the administration now at the head of the United States. We certainly hold no illusions regarding American-Zionist relations: the Nixon administration does not have the force necessary to confront Zionist pressure even if it wanted to and attempted it. No matter what, America's power to exert pressure on the enemy in the way that the regimes desire will be modified.

Here, then, is an outline of the issue before us, now and as it will appear in the near future. It reveals, to a great extent, how difficult and complex an affair this compromise is, if not impossible, given the contradictions which naturally result from the nature of this position, as well as the many aspects of this conflict involving so many different protagonists.

The problem which the veterans who direct the course of the events in this region must face is, therefore, double:

First, whatever the importance allotted to the compromise in their eyes, it cannot deceive either their citizens, their army or their nation.

Second, this compromise is not ready and guaranteed as some may believe or have been led to believe; it is closer to the impossible than to the possible.

If this is the case, what are the objectives of those people who interpreted the events in this manner? Where do they intend to drag the region? Finally, is it «wise» that others hasten to follow them, when they themselves are sinking?

Some are already preparing to play a role in the

framework of the compromise; it would be wise for these people to ask themselves if the scene is prepared and the text ready for discussion.

In any case, and whatever these regimes and their followers say or do, the truth is that the events which took place between October 6 and October 22 or 24, 1973, obtained for the nation, its masses and its revolutionary forces the strength, the determination and the confidence which will enable them to resolutely continue ther march toward liberty, unity, dignity and progress. The future is theirs...

Forward!

Supplement

«In the Heart of the Battle»

Preliminary note

The articles presented here were published in the newspaper «Al-Thawra» between October 8 ans 25, i.e., during the battle and through the cease-fire. They treat the most pressing questions for the party, the masses and the revolution in Iraq during this period, they cover the nature of the battle, the ardent desire of the Arab masses to engage in it and the participation and position of Iraq. They also discuss «the special favor» that the Zionist enemy did for American imperialism by destroying the installations at Banais which were meant to export Iraqi petroleum as a reprisal for the Iraqi nationalization of the American share of the Basra Petroleum Company on October 7. They reveal the plans and designs of the enemy during the battle and explain how to counter them. They analyse the U.S.'s hostile position vis-a-vis the Arabs, speak of the need to make new efforts to use petroleum as a weapon, and show why the continuation of the battle will lead the Arabs to victory. They cover a number of other subjects.

«Al-Thawra» is publishing these articles as a supplement to «Pertinent Problems and Questions» to allow the reader to profit from these articles as a whole.

I

Two aspects of the battle: The armed confrontation and the liquidation of American interests

«On the nationalization of the American shares in the Basra Petroleum Company»

In our battle with the enemy, we must use all the effective arms and resources we possess, place them in a universal and scientific perspective and make them part of a strategy, i.e., foresee a national battle which will only be decisive if it is long, hard and demands sacrifice.

Our past experience, particularly in June, 1967, and the six dark years that followed, has shown us that our enemy is Zionist imperialism: America, Israel and their allies. They have all been agressive toward us either directly or indirectly and they have all aided Israel in its perseverance in this agression.

When we strike, we must strike the enemy and its allies, Israel and America, at the same time. It would be erroneous and absurd to dissociate the two, for Israel would not exist if America and the other imperialist states did not have vested interests in the Arab land, if imperialism did not aim to divide and weaken us, if it did not wish to protect its own interests by preventing us from unifying, gathering strength, making progress and liberating ourselves. Israel's arms are American arms, and the money that permits it to exist and continue its agression are American dollars.

However, this money is not, strictly speaking, American, it represents a part of American profits from the exploitation of our wealth, especially petroleum. Can we allow money to go to America while Arab soldiers confront American-Israeli forces? This would not be

logical, patriotic, nationalist or scientific, and this explains the nationalizations of June 1, 1972, and October 7, 1973, which affected the American holdings in the Basra Petroleum Company.

It is the duty of the Arab nation to support its soldiers and to take part in the war, with each participating according to his situation and means.

The petroleum producing states are the key to this position. They can be effective and decisive. They can modify the situation in our favor and turn their backs on American imperialism, which created the Zionist entity and has encouraged it and given it the means for its agression.

It is time to strike at American interests on our Arab soil and liquidate them once and for all. It is time to nationalize American petroleum holdings. It is time to declare an embargo on petroleum going to America, the master and servant of Israel, the protector and instigator of the Zionist entity. In this way, we will make a genuine and decisive contribution to the battle, and we will give universal and effective support to the Arab soldiers.

After long and bitter experience with American imperialism, the Arab nation has refused to let it remain on Arab soil. The Arabs have refused to let their petroleum go to America, for each drop of petroleum tapped for the Americans becomes a bullet that kills an Arab soldier in the Sinai or on the Golan Heights. In light of this experience, the Arab nation has denounced the lies with which America attempts to disguise its hideous nature and appear neutral and in search of a «just» solution. If America were neutral, and if it truly wanted a just solution, the last Israeli occupation of Arab territory would not have lasted for six and a half years.

The Iraqi revolution has given us an example by giving the battle against the enemy two related aspects, armed combat and boycott of American interests. In order to summon all of Iraq's efforts and potential to a great national struggle, the revolution tried to resolve its existing problems with Iran along the lines of the

October 7 report presented by the High Council of the Revolution.

The valiant sons of Iraq are fighting now and will continue to fight with their brothers on both fronts, using all available means, while the revolution tears the remaining American interests in the country out by the roots.

The revolution must light the fuse of the battle that the masses consider necessary and effective to weaken the enemy and punish its masters, the Americans, and the nationalizations of the American part of the Basra Petroleum Company must lead to a series of nationalizations affecting American interests in the Arab land.

The Arab nation has bitterly suffered from American plots and Israeli agression and must now strike with force, take up arms and liquidate American interests in order to support the front and prepare for an escalation of the battle to achieve a decisive victory.

October 8, 1973

II

«The struggle that the nation has demanded for years»

The current struggle in the Arab land is the one that the nation has been waiting for for seven years, the one it has demanded, and the one whose success it asks the government to assure.

The Arab nation has risen against the Zionist usurpation of Arab Palestine and for twenty years has called for the liberation of this land and its restoration to its rightful people. It has also forcefully defied the June defeat and demanded that it become a point of departure for a victory. It has refused solutions through capitulation and liquidation and has asked for a long lasting struggle which will not stop short of total victory.

Now that the battle has started, it must respond to the desires of the nation and fulfill its hopes; we must fight on all fronts, with all military, political and human means.

The Arab nations, which constitutes a hundred million individuals and possesses very considerable resources, has always had the potential to confront Zionist imperialist agression, to liberate the Arab land and to crush the arrogant Zionists, who have tried to profit from the weakness and disunity of the nation to terrorize and humiliate it. The Arab nation will be able to effectively fight Zionism under the following conditions:

— the direct and effective participation of the Arab armed forces, which have considerable importance;

— effective and total coordination at the very highest

levels of all the principal countries: Egypt, Syria and Iraq in a nationalist and unified perspective as expressed by the plans of the revolution in Iraq in the spring of 1972;

— the serious and effective use of Arab petroleum and funds as real arms during the war, for these arms can bring American imperislism and other allies of the Zionist enemy to their knees. This is the only way to punish our enemy's allies, to arrouse the world's interest in our cause, to encourage it to condemn Zionist agression and to reveal the dangers it poses for humanity;

— the refusal of a regional conception of the confrontation and the acceptance of nationalist conceptions for our code of conduct, planning the battle, defining its objectives and executing it. In this way, the whole Arab nation will participate in the war, and strategy will be based on the entire Arab nation and defined by national objectives;

— all possible military, economic and political aid to the three principal countries which bear the brunt of the battle;

— the consolidation of the internal fronts and preparation for a long and terribly costly battle;

— the elimination of any restrictions on Palestine. We must support it on all fronts and provide it with the means necessary to fulfill its role as the avant-garde of the battle.

When these conditions have been fulfilled, the Arab nation, through a long, hard and onerous battle, will be victorious.

Even though the struggle has already started, it is not too late to meet the above conditions. The Arab spirit —and the Arab will, which accept the risks of a fierce battle— must act with foresight and immediately provide the means for victory.

We have always insisted that the Zionist myth is hollow, for the Zionists are only strong if we are weak, disunited and preoccupied with secondary battles which

prevent us from addressing our essential problems.

The Zionist gang can never defeat a nation of a hundred million individuals unless the latter do not know how to use their resources effectively. If they do decide to use them, if they join ranks and forces, and if they engage in battle with dignity and courage, an Arab victory will be asured.

The revolution in Iraq has prepared the war and played, in an exemplary way, an extensive and decisive role in it.

— the Iraqi revolution, with the help of its avant-garde party, consolidated the internal front so that it would offer solid support in the battle and so that the entirety of the country's resources would go towards meeging the needs of the battle.

— it liquidated imperialist interests, which constitute basic reason for the existence and agression of the Zionist entity, and by doing so have opened fire on this front, one of the most important in the war we wage against the enemy and its allies.

When the war broke out, despite restraining geographical and time factors, the revolution, inspired by courage and a profound confidence in itself, its triumphant army, its masses and its mission, immediately liquidated the last bastions of imperialist interests in the country. It called for a settlement of all conflicts with Iran in order to devote the entire Iraqi potential to the battle. The armed forces engaged in the battle from the beginning. Today, thanks to the inmense efforts of these forces to surmount the obstacles posed by geography and the war tactics (the element of surprise), Iraq is in the front lines of the confrontation.

Let us fulfill the conditions for success of this long and triumphant battle!

Let us act with force! Our nation is strong and our armies are strong, courageous and have superior arms. Our nation has enormous reserves which will open up as the war intensifies; new capacities will appear, for there are still resources which have never been used, or have been used only partially. When we devote all Arab

resources to the battle at all levels, we will be stronger and our position will be more solid. Then we will give the enemy the lesson that we should have given it years ago.

In addition, we have a comment on the enemy's intention to sow discord and spread rumors about inter-Arab relations, particularly between Syria and Iraq. The rumors are futile and without effect, and will find no audience among the Arab crowds that hasten to the battle.

All these disagreements will fade on the battlefield and disappear under fire.

When Iraq enters the battle with all its resources, it is to fight the treacherous enemy and add its strength to the forces of its brothers until the hour of victory.

The Arab masses and armies fight as one unit, as one bloc, to liberate their land and to raise high the standard of the nation, the standard of victory.

Tuesday, October 9, 1973

III

«How did Iraq take part in the war?» «What was its position?»*

Today, for the sixth day, the Arab forces are storming the northern and western fronts. The valiant Arab soldiers are fighting with a courage that confirms the erosion of the Zionist myth and restores the truth about the Arab people. Our Arab army is valiant, competent, and ready to make endless sacrifices for the cause of the nation, right, liberty and justice.

During the first few hours of the war, the Arab air force, which had been stationed on the western front for several months, opened fire on the enemy positions in the Arab Sinai. Within a few hours of the beginning of the war, other Iraqi fighters streamed to the northern front, engaging in combat with courage and ability, destroying with their brothers on both fronts the myth of the «superiority of the Israeli air force», which, along with the myth of the «invencibility of the Israeli army» had been produced by the situation after June, 1967. When the Arabs truly decided to fight, these myths fell amidst the debris of real battles.

While all eyes were fixed on the battlefield and all hearts impatient to learn the details, others watched in order to evaluate lucidly and in a nationalist perspective the events, the method of participation in the fight, the

* Article published in two parts in the daily «Al-Thawra». Thursday and Friday, October 11 and 12, 1973.

framework of this participation and its orientation. In this regard, we should mention the role played by Iraq, directed by a nationalist revolutionary party whose primary objective is the liberation of the national land, where the will of the masses has been freed, and where parties and patriotic forces have united to form a truly effective front.

We would not boast at a moment when sacred Arab blood is being shed in our land for the most noble and important of Arab causes; we only want to show the objective truth, to define the means we must use and the road we must follow in order that the battle be victorious and that its scope be great enough to fulfill the aspirations of the masses, in other words, to achieve a total victory over the enemy, even if the road proves long, hazardous and demands inmense sacrifice. An objective discussion is necessary; our experience has confirmed this fact, and obliges us to learn all lessons that can be of use, even in times of intense emotion.

The battle which is now being fought on the northern and western fronts has two dimensions, one regional (the liberation of Syrian and Egyptian territories occupied by the enemy in June, 1967) and one national (the liberation of territories belonging to the whole nation, even if they are considered «Egyptian», «Syrian», or «Palestinian» from a regional point of view).

Each of these dimensions has its own logic. In the logic of the liberation of different countries' territories, the battle concerns the government, army and people of each country. In the logic of the liberation of «national» land, the task belongs to the governments, armies, and people of the entire nation. Between the two is an intermediate logic, one of «Arab solidarity», according to which it is principally up to the country involved to liberate its land itself, and act as it sees fit. But those who hold this opinion, whether for sentimental, national or political reasons, believe that the Arab governments should aid each other with funds, arms, men, and any other means of assistance.

Given these three «logics» in the struggle for libera-

tion, how shall we define the role of the people, the army and the leaders of Iraq?

It is obvious that Iraq's participation in the war is not a «regional» duty, for Iraqi land is not occupied. It is equally obvious that peoples, armies and governments fight to liberate their occupied territories. This is one of their most elementary duties and one of the basic principles of their existence. Nevertheless, Iraq as a country does not face this task.

We will not wrong anyone by saying that numerous Arab circles place us in the framework of «Arab solidadity». In other words, they would like us to give all the assistance we can, in any way possible, as do certain Arab groups in the spirit of «Arab solidarity». Those who believe this neglect two important truths. The first is that since 1948, the people and army of Iraq have represented a fundamental part of the Arab nation with a great impact on the battle with the enemy, its direction, and its fate. The second is that Iraq is at present directed by a nationalist party that in thought, organization and military heroism was the first to emphasize unity behind the national cause and the Arab struggle. In addition, the progressive forces in Iraq, united around the program of revolutionary struggle (the Charter of National Action) confirm the unity of this struggle and its fundamental objectives and explain why this country, instead of being confined by the limits of Arab solidarity, must be the avant-garde and contribute totally to the battle. This is «nationalist» logic that considers the liberation of the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and Palestine as much their responsibility as that of the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Palestinians and all the Arabs.

How has Iraq expressed this conception?

1. The revolution in Iraq has emphasized the importance of petroleum as a weapon for a long time, thus using a tangible truth recognized by the Arab forces as well as the enemy. These were not empty words.

The revolution bases its points of view on a living experience which is shown in the petroleum policy of

Iraq and the historic nationalization of June, 1972.

In the beginning of 1973, the Iraqi revolution proposed its plan to use petroleum in the battle to the Arab states and declared itself ready to honor its commitments immediately if Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian resistance approved and joined this plan. However, the proposal was shelved by the Arab League. When these three parties first fired on the Zionist enemy, the Iraqi revolution fulfilled its promises and nationalized the American shares of the Basra Petroleum Company. This decision started a heated «political» battle with imperialism that coincided with the opening of an intense military struggle with Zionism, for, as the experience of the Arab nation, especially during the last six years, has confirmed, imperialism and Zionism are one and the same enemy.

The nationalization of the American shares in the Basra Petroleum Company (B.P.C.) is not an «economic» battle in the limited sense of the word. It differs in several respects from the nationalization of the Iraqian Petroleum Company (I.P.C.) of June, 1972. The latter affected all companies dependent on a number of Western states and constituted a patriotic, economic and political struggle with national objectives made possible by the unity of the national cause and the correlation of its diverse aspects. The nationalization of October 7 was a direct punishment of the United States alone, for this power is the principal ally of our enemy; it encourages its agression and scorn for our rights, and openly provides it with the means to continue its agression. The least one can say is that every weapon killing our children on both the northern and western fronts is American. This is why this agressive and scornful power deserves to be punished by the Arabs at the moment when our nation has decided to punish Israel. These considerations were the source of the nationalization of petroleum.

The nationalization of American holdings is the beginning of a great political battle which must be started inmediately, concommitantly with the great military battle, and the two must be coordinated

according to the strategic objectives of the struggle.

Can we permit the political struggle against the allies of the Zionist enemy to be extinguished, as it is now, at the moment when we open fire on it in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights? Such a battle, particularly when it is against the United States, is not launched by speeches, telegrams of protest and verbal condemnations. Petroleum is the Arab's great, effective and decisive political weapon. If they use it, they will change the balance of forces and add a decisive element to their potential and international position which will in turn allow them to impose their will and achieve victory. It is strange that there is a lugubrious silence in the petroleum world with the exception of the reverberations of the nationalization in Iraq— while at the same time the military battle intensifies and becomes vaster than any the Arab nation has known in contemporary history! Let us therefore put the political struggle on a greater scale in all the Arab petroleum producing countries. Let these countries carry out their national promises in this kind of a battle, for this is the only effective way to participate in a general battle. Let their promises make them take a stand, let them show their nobility, authenticity and sincerity. This can only be done by nationalization of American holdings and an embargo on all petroleum destined for the US, and this is what Iraq has done since the second day of the hostilities. We warn the world that this time the Arab nation will not accept superficial solutions like those of 1956 and 1967. We have seen how effective they are, and know what abuse and hypocrisy they conceal.

If these governments do not do their duty, to the nation, it is up to the masses to force them. Heroism and sacrifice are not limited to the military battlefield, they extend to supporting fronts, especially the decisive petroleum front. The masses and their revolutionary forces must try to use petroleum as a weapon in the battle using all means, with courage and the spirit of absolute sacrifice necessary on the military field.

In conclusion, the nationalization of American holdings in the Basra Petroleum Company is a concrete

example of the assertion that Iraq's participation is not limited to the framework of «Arab soludarity»; instead, it is in the framework of responsibility and total participation of the avant-garde. Iraq has started the supporting political battle and bears its consequences.

Iraq has not been content to merely open the petroleum battle, it has participated in all the other key actions of the war.

2. After opening the political front by nationalizing American petroleum interests in the country and demanding the liquidation of all these interests in the Arab land, Iraq immediately sent military aid, despite the fact that the hostilities took it by surprise; it only heard the news over the radio like every Arab citizen.

Iraq's first act was to commit its air force. The planes of this force have been on the western front for several months and have been fighting constantly since the beginning. The military communiques testify to this participation.

On Sunday, the morning of the second day, a number of Iraqi military planes gathered on the northern front and participated in force in the offensive, as the military communiques also recognize. Despite the strategic importance of the Iraqi air foce, Iraq's aid has not been limited to this domain. The authorities immediately decided to send the infantry in great numbers, despite the following difficulties:

A. On the one hand, relations between Iraq and Iran had been deteriorating for years and had become seriously strained. On the other, the imperatives of national defense had obliged Iraq to concentrate a substantial number of its armed forces along the eastern border of the country, which extends for hundreds of miles.

When the war broke out on October 6, Iraq was certainly capable of sending several contingents of its reserve forces as a symbolic gesture of participation. But, as we have emphasized above, Iraq does not look at the struggle from the perspective of «Arab solidarity» which considers the amount and kind of participation in terms of an ordinary situation. It regards it as a battle of

national liberation, to which it must commit all its resources and which demands exceptional means, extraordinary decisions and inmense sacrifice.

Iraq has never had hostile intentions toward Iran. It has always wished to live in peace and cooperate with this country. But the relations between this country and the United States on the one hand, and its relations with Iraq and the Gulf countries on the other, have, despite all efforts, created unsurmountable obstacles. One example of the attempts to overcome these difficulties was the meeting between the ministers of foreign affairs of Iran and Iraq in April, 1973, in Geneva, which has been proposed during the Iranian emissaries' previous visit to Bagdad.

Iraq has continued this policy, constantly expressing its desire to establish neighborly relations with Iran and settle their conflicts in a cooperative spirit worthy of their long and historic relationship. (Iraqi spokesmen confirmed this attitude during the Iranian emissaries' visit to Bagdad at the beginning of this year). Thus, en October 7, 1973, Iraq decided to reestablish normal diplomatic relations with Iran essentially in order to devote its great military potential to the national battle, despite the great sacrifices that this initiative entailed. However, we insist that the decision of October 7, 1973, was not «tactical» and will not be altered by any change in the present situation. As soon as this decision was made, it became an irrevocable commitment. Iraq honors its commitments as long as others respond in kind. (Cf. the Declaration of the High Council of the Revolution on October 7, 1973).

B. Everyone knows that Iraq alone among the countries confronting the enemy has a serious «internal security» problem due to the situation in the north. We obviously have no intention of presenting this problem in detail, but we must emphasize that despite all efforts to resolve the Kurdish problem democratically and peacefully, despite our absolute confidence in our Kurdish people and their virtues, despite our conviction that the internal front is solid and that all patriotic forces (Arabs,

Kurds and other minorities) share a grave sense of responsibility, especially at this moment; we cannot —due to circumstances beyond our control and beyond the control of all patriotic, Arab and Kurdish forces— either neglect or treat lightly the danger that menaces the unity of our land and the internal security of our country.

C. In light of the points above and despite the fact that they demanded that we take different measures and use our forces differently, the revolution decided to send the Iraqi infantry into battle.

However, the realisation of this objetive raised a number of serious problems that had to be dealt with.

Since the Iraqi army was very far from the battle-field, sometimes as far as 1000 miles, the military command had to lead the contingents over a long distance and protect them from the enemy. (In fact, the enemy did try to attack our forces in the course of the journey, during the night of the 9th and 10th, but our forces overcame it.) This was an extremely difficult and complex operation. Even in peacetime, an army can only move in small numbers and according to a definite schedule. A movement in time of war presents even greater difficulties, complications and dangers. We overcame these difficulties with unprecedented efforts, well above our normal capacity, and gathered on the northern front with effectives and arms that surprised the enemy. These proved to be of decisive importance in the battle and the final victory.

There are a number of truths about Iraq's position, its participation in the battle, its circumstances and the obstacles it faced that the present situation prevents revealing. The day will come when we can speak of them.

The outstanding Iraqi pilot fighting on the western front and the pilot and soldier on the northern front are fighting neither in their land nor for territories of «their» land. They are fighting enthusiastically and believe in the necessity of fighting on «national» soil for the

liberation of this land thousands of miles from «their» country, for they are protected by people who will provide them with everything necessary to continue their task and be victorious.

Iraq is not taking part in the war because of considerations of «Arab solidarity», but because it is inspired by a deep faith in the unity of the national cause and the common national objectives and because it is ready to face incommensurable difficulties and make heroic sacrifices.

We will continue in this way, doing everything in our power to reach the noble national goal of liberating the Arab land —all the Arab land— in Egypt, Syria and Palestine.

Iraq courageously refuses to limit itself in either theory or practice to the framework of «Arab solidarity» that others accept, and it will make all necessary sacrifices and assume the responsibility for commiting its forces to the national cause, the cause of the liberation of the Arab land.

In this just and noble cause, our nation will be victorious.

Forward!

IV

«The October 7 Coup will not be limited to Basra!»

«On the enemy attack on the installations at Banais for exporting Iraqi petroleum»

Was the bombing of the installations for exporting Iraqi petroleum at Banais, on the Syrian coast, another treacherous act committed by the enemy in the last days of the war in reaction to its confusion and its defeats and in revenge for important losses?

Or was it an American act, by which the lords of the White House, with the aid of their pernicious instrument, Israel, hoped to take revenge on the country that had punished them on October 7 by nationalizing their petroleum interests and opening an extensive battle centered around petroleum?

We make no distinction between the U.S. and Israel or between their ventures in the Arab land. They are but two faces of imperialism, usurpation and agression. However, there are times when each one has «specific» projets which it trys to carry out itself or asks the other to do as a «special favor». We are convinced that the bombing of the petroleum installations at Banais was a «special favor» that Israel did for its masters in the White House who were afraid that one day petroleum would be used as a weapon against them and who seethed in hatred of the unruly Iraq who «poured a cauldron of boiling oil» on them every time they tried to corner or eliminate it!

The United States is trying to take its revenge in this vile manner, but there are things they do not know!

When we decided on the nationalization of June 1,

1972, we knew from the start that the battle would be long, difficult and costly. We also knew that the imperialists would not fold their hands, but would try to take revenge in some form. We decided to nationalize despite this knowledge, because there are many of us who believe that legitimate rights can only be defended by a courageous assault on the usurpers of these rights. Our plans thus took into account the worst that could happen, and even when we achieved victory on March 1, 1973 and forced the monopolies to cede to our demands and desire for independence, we did not neglect the worst prospects in elaborating our future plans. Hence the project of the so-called strategic pipeline which allows us to transport petroleum to three outlets, two on the Meditteranean and the third on the Gulf of Arabia.

On October 7, the second day of the war against the Zionist enemy, we nationalized the American shares in the Basra Petroleum Company to punish this powerful ally of our enemy who gives it the support it needs to persist in its agression toward us. We knew then that the United States would try to take revenge, but we acted because the only defense against agression is a direct attack on the enemy. Thus we acted in full awareness of the worst prospects.

For this reason we were not surprised by American reprisals carried out by Israeli agents in the guise of military conflicts in the region.

Because we were not surprised, the consequences of our actions did not catch us off our guard.

American imperialists, whose efforts have proved futile and whose computerized minds have been defied by the will of the people, thinks that they have sanctioned those who nationalized their shares in the Basra Petroleum Company and scalded them during the second day of fighting. However, as the United States noticed in Vietnam and is now noticing in the Arab land, its pathetic acts only serve to dig a grave for its monopolistic interests and soon, all its other interests. In fact, the blow dealt it on October 7 at Basra will not be the last; the Arab masses will strike again, in the South, in the

West, in the Arab land from the Atlantic to the Gulf. What happened at «Basra» was not an «Iraqi» operation, but the result of a truly «Arab» stance which was first taken in this honored Arab city and will soon spread throughout the land.

In conclusion, we would like to briefly address the persons meeting in Kuwait to study the «manner» of using petroleum as a weapon in the battle: take a look at the north, look at Basra, and you will find an example of this «manner». Do not tire yourselves with long discussions and in-depth studies!! The nation has discovered the path and embarked on it on October 6 and 7: it uses one hand to strike the enemy with arms and the other to eradicate its interests and the interests of its allies and masters.

Saturday, October 13, 1973

V

«What are the enemy's plans and intentions?» «How shall we confront them?»

We are now in the tenth day of a relentless battle between the valiant Arab forces and the Zionist enemy, the longest and fiercest confrontation in a quarter of a centrury. The enemy has suffered enormous human and material losses, and its internal front is menaced by military, economic and psychological difficulties. The exemplary courage of the Arab nation, on the other hand, confirms its capacity to face the usurping enemy.

In the past, some have questioned this truth and others have been but little persuaded of it, but we have always had absolute confidence in our nation's capabilities and considered previous defeats «unnatural» accidents due to particular circumstances, for as soon as the Arab nation has the opportunity to show its true character, as soon as it decides to enter a war and commit all its resources, our victory is assured.

This is true for the simple reason that a nation of one hundred million individuals cannot be defeated by an entity of less than three million people, no matter what this entity's means and alliances are.

For example, Great Britain, a country of fifty million people, was able to colonize India, a country of hundreds of millions of individuals for centuries. But as soon as the colonized nation revolted and fought courageously for its liberty, the British colonial forces were swept under by the native population, and the greatest colonial

power of the age was forced to submit to the will of the Hindu people.

This is one example among many in recent history which we cite to corroborate our assertion.

In our battle with the Zionist enemy, we must remember certain essential points:

1. fight with determination and perseverance, no matter what the sacrifices are;

2. engage all Arab resources directly in the battle and act in all domains according to the perspective of a national war;

3. use all other Arab resources in the battle; land, men, money and arms;

4. create the conditions for reinforcement of the internal front and assure that the war is a war of the whole nation, not just of the armed forces.

This is the way the Arabs must use their resources in a war with the Zionists.

The first of these conditions was fulfilled ten days ago, when the Arab forces attacked enemy positions on the northern and eastern fronts. They launched a battle that neither the enemy nor its allies expected. Since this condition, the determining factor in the battle, has been realized there have been many changes, namely, the end of an era when, on government orders, a soldier retreated leaving his arms behind. Now he shows his true nature as an outstanding soldier who fights with courage and handles his sophisticated arms with great skill. This is why the enemy suffered the defeat it did not expect.

The enemy has not suffered such blows and losses since it illegitimately established itself on our land. Up to this point, it has attacked us, occupied new territories and inflicted enormous losses on us without any harm to itself. This state of affairs fed its vanity and encouraged its agression, usurpation and scorn for our rights.

Today, the enemy is losing, and losing badly. Whereas in the past it delighted in strolling through Arab territories, now every hour of battle means hundreds of dead, wounded and prisoners, scores of planes, tanks and guns destroyed and millions of dollars lost. This is a

factor of considerable importance, which will have a decisive influence on the development of our struggle with the enemy.

The second condition —the direct commitment of all principal resources to the struggle— has been realized to an extent that has surprised the enemy.

In the June 1967 confrontation, the enemy launched its offensive against the Arabs taking every front separately, in accordance with what is called in military language «mobilization of internal lines». Each Arab front fought according to its own means; the participation of others was symbolic and of no significance. This is why the enemy was able to achieve a military victory so rapidly.

When the war broke out on October 6, new circumstances favored the Arabs. Despite this, during the past few days, the enemy persisted in its old tactic of concentrating first on one front, neutralizing it, eliminating it, and pressing on to the next. This time, they first concentrated on the northern front.

However, this tactic, as the enemy itself recognized, did not attain ist goal as rapidly as planned, and cost the enemy enormous losses. The northern «Syrian» front was no longer fighting wiht the means of Syria alone; within a few days it had combined the military and economic capacities of Syria and Iraq.

This new situation cost the enemy dearly, for it had counted on the Iraqi forces not entering the battle, or only participating symbolically, in the framework of «Arab solidarity». It also thought that if these forces arrived, they would arrive too late to help the Syrian forces which would already have withdrawn from battle. However, as it faced the resistance of the valiant Syrian forces and their extraordinary fighting spirit, it was also confronted by incessant waves of Iraqi troops which arrived on the battlefield in organized and complete formations, armed with extremely powerful weapons and inspired by a heroic determination to fight. This factor has been very influential in the last few days of the battle and will be equally influential on the outcome of the continually intensifying war. The enemy counted on

rapidly weakening the Syrian rear guard by bombing civilian targets, and during the last few days it has savagely tried to accomplish this. But the enemy did not expect the rear guard of the Arab army on the Golan Heights to extend from Damascus to Basra, covering the entire territory of Syria and Iraq and including the entirety of their great economic means and populations.

However, as we are already in the morning of the tenth day of fighting, we must know precisely what the enemy wants and what its tactics are so that we will be fully prepared to confront it and thwart its plans.

Aside from the details of the first days, the enemy's present tactic is similar to that of June 5. The facts of the present war prove that this tactic is not the «famous Zionist creation»; it is the only way for it to fight, for without this tactic, it would run the risk of being defeated, for the plurality of fronts in the Arab nation is one of the Arabs most important advantages.

The essential point of the enemy's strategy is the lightning attack and the termination of the war in a few days, for despite its capacities, the enemy cannot continue to fight for an extended period of time. Although this situation differs in many respects from that of June, the enemy tries to make the war suit this strategy.

In light of these new circumstances the enemy has been unable to put an end to the war as a whole in a few days. Nine days have passed and the violence of the fighting has not diminished. This is why, in accordance with the essential element of its strategy, the enemy is using its old method of concentrating the greater part of its forces on a single front in an attempt to remove it from the field of combat and pass on to another.

On June 5, it concentrated on the western front; now it gives priority to the northern front. There are good reasons for this. For six years, the enemy has shown no intention of withdrawing from the Golan Heights whereas it has been more flexible about evacuation of the Sinai and certain parts of the West Bank. It is fighting fiercely on the northern front because it cannot afford any losses there. In addition, the enemy thought that it

would rapidly be victorious on this front, which would morally, politically and militarily aid to fight the other front and impose its conditions. It also tried in every way to pressure the Syrian troops into withdrawyng from combat before the Iraqi troops could join them. Then, when the latter did participate, the enemy mustered its greatest resources and for the last few days has been fighting desparately to neutralize the Syrian and Iraqi troops on the northern front. This is the immediate cause of the widescale fighting of the last few days.

Aside from this, there is not yet a third front as there was on June 5, 1967. This is why the enemy has tried in all ways and with the aid of its allies to keep the Jordanian front out of the field of battle, for it cannot fight on three fronts at once. The opening of the Jordanian front would be an especially immediate danger for well known reasons: the role the Arab population of the West Bank could play by engaging the enemy outside of military combat and the proximity of this front to the heart and vital points of the Zionist entity.

The determination of the enemy to put a rapid end to the war for fear that it might last too long drives it, as we have said, to concentrate on and try to eliminate the northern front. It has one of two objectives: either to use its victory on the northern front in its battle on the western front, or to use it to demand a cease-fire and gain political advantages.

By concentrating its greatest military forces on the northern front, the enemy expects not only to neutralize this front but desperately hopes to win a dazzling victory such as the occupation or military defeat of Damasus, by either arriving at its gates with its army or by definitively crossing the old cease-fire lines. They think that by achieving this —which will never succeed because of the presence and heroism of the Syrian and Iraqi armies— they will be able to choose between using this victory to continue the battle on the western front or asking for a cease-fire and negotiating from a more favorable position for compensation for its recent material and moral losses.

In the case cited above, it is probable that the enemy

will resort to a cease-fire. This will enable it to break through the impass imposed by the continuation of fighting which is beyond its capacity. It will also permit the enemy to prepare for a new war of vengance which it will declare after a respite of a few months when it has the initiative and conditions are more favorable.

The enemy's plans have been made on the assumption that it is more capable of compensating for its losses of technicians than the Arab countries. The advanced industrial countries provide it with immigrants with sufficient technical knowledge to replace arms specialists which it lost during the war, whereas it takes the Arabs several years to train officers and soldiers for similar replacements. The enemy also expects the United States to compensate its losses more rapidly than the Soviet Union will the Arabs' and imagines that Arab-Soviet relations, especially in the period preceding the war were such that the Soviet Union might withdraw in the future, despite all the repercussions this would have.

The enemy is trying to transform its enormous losses of the last few days into a military and political victory by appearing victorious on one front, pretending to be concerned about «asking for peace», «stopping the bloodshed» and «maintaining security and stability in the region and the world» and then taking the military and political initiative for new agression against the Arabs.

How should we face the enemy, thwart its plans and make its strategy fail?

If the central element of the enemy's strategy is to rapidly bring the war to an end by any means, the central element of our strategy should be to prolong the war.

This is the enemy's Achilles' heel, for a perpetuation of the fighting would be fatal for it. We have already discussed this question and all Arab thinkers and military strategists have pointed out its importance. Thus we have fought valiantly in the ten days since the war broke out, and we must continue to fight, no matter what the cost, in the understanding that this war differs in nature from others. Each time we have been in battle with the enemy, it has taken the initiative and stopped

the fighting after having usurped all the territory it wanted and was capable of assimilating. In this case, every square inch of territory is important. However, if we take the initiative and continue to fight with determination and with a violence that terrifies the enemy and causes it severe losses, the amount of territory controlled by the enemy will not be an advantage for it, but a liability which will allow us to descend upon it at the right moment. This is why, at this stage of the war, we should not be concerned about the amount of territory occupied by the enemy, but concetrate all our efforts and resources on waging the battle on a greater scale and inflicting the greatest possible losses on the enemy.

In addition, in order to counter the enemy's principal tactic, shortening the war, we must thwart its other tactic, the effort to concentrate on one front in order to neutralize it and move on to another.

One of the main reasons for the enemy's previous victories is that we mistakenly adopted a «regional» point of view. However, if we act according to a national (pan-Arab) perspective; if we consider the two fronts as two parts of the same body, guided by the same plan, sharing the burden and each benefitting from the position of the other; if we adopt an attitude that is based on the principles of national struggle, rational planning and effective combat, then, for the first time in the history of the conflict, we can rise in strength against the enemy, thwart its plans, take the initiative in the war, and be victorious on two fronts.

Next, in order to reach the goals outlined above, we must do whatever is in our power to open the third front: the Jordanian front. The entire Arab nation, its people and its governments, must use all their efforts to open this front immediately. We should not consider the dispatch of a unit of the Jordanian army to Syria as a substitute for opening the Jordanian front. The Arab nation needs the Jordanian army fighting on its own front. The Arab countries that want to aid in the battle must send their soldiers to the Jordanian front (if it is open) so that all their resources will be committed to battle with the enemy and

that the third front will operate together with the first two. The simultaneous opening of three fronts will lead to the dispersal of the enemy's forces, especially since the Palestinian resistance could play an important role in the battle on the third front.

The Zionist enemy is not alone in its desire to bring the war rapidly to an end by the means indicated above. Imperialist forces, particularly the United States, share this desire.

American imperialism knows that if the war continues, if it takes place on three fronts and if it takes on a national character, it will cease to be a simple confrontation with the enemy and will become a total struggle for liberation directed against both Zionism and imperialism, which are intimately related. A battle that lasts only a few days will not reveal the issue at stake, but a battle that continues will summon all the resources of the nation to this struggle. At this point, American imperialist interests, the principal reason for the existence of the Zionist entity in our land, will be in danger.

If the battle is short, reactionary forces at the service of imperialism will deceive us by pretending to participate in the battle (they are always careful to make their participation symbolic and too late) while preparing to direct events after the battle in a way that will favor the interests of the Zionist entity and its master, imperialism.

The continuation of the fighting will thwart the plans of the agents of imperialism and place them in a criticai situation, where they will have to either reveal their true nature and intentions or submit to the will of the people. This will be a great gain for the nation, which will be freed from the charlatans and hypocrites.

The continuation of the battle will give the Arab masses and their loyal patriotic forces the initiative in the struggle, for they alone are capable of defeating the Zionist entity and its master, imperialism.

We must always go forward!

Monday, October 15, 1973

VI

«The continuation of the struggle is the road to victory»

With each day of fighting, the plans and tactics of the enemy fall apart, its deceptive myths are exposed, and its internal structures threaten to collapse.

If one follows the false and contradictory news about the fighting that the enemy spreads, the analyses and forecasts that it publishes and the pathetic, ridiculous lies that its media propagates, any one who is up to date on the opinions of the press and Western political circles, be he pro-Israel, neutral or quasi-neutral, will understand the profound and significant impact of ten days of the Arab's victorious fight against the Zionist entity. Imagine, then, the impact of a battle of several weeks —or monts.

The enemy created its heterogeneous entity by deceiving Jewish immigrants from all parts of the world with no conception of the reality of the Arab nation and country and inculcating them with the idea that the Arabs were divided, under-developed and powerless whereas Israel was strong and invincible. After twenty five years of persisting in this deceitful attitude, the enemy now finds itself stifled by general scepticism, confusion and internal erosion. In fact, during the last ten days of fighting, the Jewish population and soldiers have definitely realized that they are facing the united Arab nation on the battlefield, that the Arabs can use sophisticated modern arms skillfully and that they have decided to fight with extraordinary heroism.

This is the sum of ten days of fighting, to which should be added the loss of thousands of human lives, hundreds of tanks and planes and billions of dollars.

A continuation of the battle, which is perfectly possible, will undoubtedly hasten the collapse of the enemy's interior front and make its losses unbearable.

We must not forget (and we are constantly reminded) that the enemy still has great military and economic resources and that the United States will compensate its losses to a great extent. However, we must understand that the enemy is in a new, extremely difficult situation; it is being strangled.

The fact that the enemy has resources is nothing new, we have known it for a long time. Likewise, we knew of American aid, and expected it from the very beginning of the fighting. On the other hand, a new element has surprised the enemy; the remarkable capacity of the Arabs to continue fighting, to inflict heavy losses on the enemy and thereby gain an advantageous position despite their sacrifices. What is more, with every day of the fighting this position will become stronger.

We must concentrate our military, economic, human and political efforts on the enemy's weak point, its inability to continue the war. In other words, we must continue to fight with perseverance and resolution, no matter what sacrifices the war demands.

We must also force the enemy to fight with equal energy on the two fronts that are now open, the northern and southern ones, and we must by all means prevent it from adopting its old tactic of isolating one front and moving on to another, for without this tactic it cannot survive for long.

At the same time, we must make the greatest effort possible to open a third front, the Western Jordanian front and push the Jordanian army and all possible Arab reinforcements into battle.

Since the beginning of the hostilities, the enemy has propagated the illusion that the war would soon end to its advantage, and its pitiful press has published imaginary figures on Arab losses. However, the continuation

of the fighting has shown the futility of this effort and has definitively proved that the present military and economic potential of the Arabs is several times the losses incurred during these ten day of battle. It also shows that the Arabs are not only unquestionably capable of such an undertaking, but can even go further. As for the enemy, despite its remaining resources and the assistance of the United States, it is incapable of continuing, incapable of sustaining losses and incapable of maintaining its contradictory internal structures, which have deteriorated to the point of collapse.

The balance of military power during these ten days has been in our favor, it is still in our favor,and will continue to be so to the end, as long as we continue fighting.

The events on the northern front confirm this truth.

A the beginning of the war, the balance of military forces was in favor of the Arabs. With each passing day, the enemy frantically tried to eliminate this front from the battle. While this front resisted, the Iraqi striking force entered the war with its full impact. At this, the enemy lost its head, used even greater means and committed a significant amount of American aid immediately to the battle in a desperate effort to rapidly defeat the Iraqi forces and confuse the Iraqi ranks and the whole northern front. Even thought the first Iraqi troops to confront the enemy were not great in number, they were able to resist heroically. The pilots, soldiers and officiers of the tank divisions and the other units of the Iraqi army showed unequalled courage on the battlefield. In this way, the northern front was able to resist and then be reinforced by the arrival of other Iraqi troops and the reorganization of Arab forces to compensate for their losses. Now, on the eleventh day, the northern front continues to resist, fight, shatter the enemy's image, thwart its tactics, and force it to retreat. This experience assures us that with a continuation of the fighting, the Arabs will be better prepared and will have greater resources whereas the enemy will have just the opposite.

The Arab nation still has vast military, economic and

human potential that has not yet been used in the battle. If this potential is used on the battlefield, the time element, which is now and will continue to be in our favor, will become even more important. In addition, the most effective way to attract this potential to the battle is to continue fighting.

The weapon of petroleum, which has remained on the sidelines of the battle (with the exception of Iraq's revolutionary decision to nationalize the two American companies) will certainly come into play. The only guarantee for this is to continue fighting, for, like the enemy, those who have been silent for these ten days have counted on the battle ending rapidly. Even if it is possible to be clever and hypocrital for two, three, or even ten days, such an attitude cannot last in the face of a battle that continues for weeks. Thus the leaders who are totally dependent on imperialism, who hesitate and fear the consequences of action, cannot persist in this attitude for long. Whether they like it or not, they will be forced to use petroleum as a weapon in the battle.

In addition, the Arab masses and particularly the Palestinian resistance constitutes a force that has not been used to its greatest potential in the battle; first, because the Jordanian front has been quiet and second, because for the last few days the battle has been primarily military (between air and tank divisions). If the war continues, develops and takes on different forms, and if we succeed in opening the Jordanian front, the enormous potential of the fighting masses and the Palestinian resistance will have a decisive effect on the scope of the battle and direct it towards total liberation.

In conclusion, we believe that after eleven days of combat, rich in heroic acts, victories and hopes, it is time for the numerous Arab groups to go beyond the limits of «Arab solidarity» and act in a nationalist perspective. In this way, the Arab land will become the graveyard of its invaders and agressors; the imperialists and the Zionists.

Forward!

Tuesday, October 16, 1973

VII

«The United States' hostility towards us cannot be greater than it is now»

We find ourselves in another day of fighting, which will lead to new battles and new blows against the enemy, the invader, the usurper. We will continue this struggle for liberation which is the most glorious in our recent history and one of the most important in the history of the world.

The last twelve days have proved that we are strong and capable of sustaining the battle until the moment of victory. During these days of fighting, our allies and powers friendly toward us, the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and all the free people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, have not left our side. They have aided us unceasingly and sincerely in all ways.

During these twelve days, we have been able to persuade certain elements is Western Europe to take positions more favorable to our cause (in comparison with their previous positions). These new stances consolidate our strategic positions and strengthen our international position.

In truth, our struggle with the Zionist enemy has always been and continues to be one of the most just and unequivocal in the history of humanity. The essential problem has never been that this cause lacked clarity or legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The crux of the problem has been the weakness, the hesitancy and the disunity of the Arab regimes and their failure to follow the correct path for anyone fighting for a cause; the path

of intense struggle and determination to defend justice no matter what sacrifices this demands.

The international community has learned more about our cause in twelve days of fighting than it had in the last twenty five years. The reason is simple: for a few days we have taken the correct path, the only one that the world understands and respects.

Now, for the first time since the establishement of the Zionist entity, one great truth has become overwhelmingly evident on the international scene: the Zionist entity is isolated from the international community whereas the Arabs are powerful and enjoy considerable and loyal support in this same community.

What is the significance of this fact? Where will this new and favorable situation lead us? The answer is simple: the path that led us to our present situation will also permit us to consolidate our gains and make them work in our favor. This path, is, of course, the path of courageous and unhesitating perseverance in battle. We cannot allow ourselves —as experience has shown— to search for other routes; we must continue the battle until we are victorious.

Up to this point, the attitude of a large part of the international community towards us was hardly encouraging. This was not because we were «extremists» but because we were vociferous, we made verbal threats, we raged, and we did nothing serious. The enemy, on the other hand, acted seriously, and thus the international community considered our cause (in reality one of the most just and unequivocal) absurd. However, as soon as we began to act seriously and as soon as the world recovered from its stupor after the first few days of fighting, the international community began to see and believe that our cause was just and that we were able to master the situation.

The only ones that continue to be agressive and hostile toward us are the American imperialists. This is hardly because they are unable to grasp the true nature of our cause or because they are unaware of the events in the Arab land and thus do not understand their signifi-

cance. The only reason is that American imperialism and Zionism are one and the same thing. Every shot fired at the Zionist enemy is also directed at the American imperialists and vice versa. Even if certain Arabs, through their ignorance or hypocrisy, do not understand or refuse to admit through hypocrisy that the United States and the Zionist enemy are intimately bound, the American imperialists do not hesitate to insolently affirm the existence of this bond and are overtly agressive toward us.

Therefore, any efforts to «convince» the United States to be «conciliatory», to «analyse» their attitude and so forth will be of no use. Six dark years of incessant «political activity» have confirmed this reality. We hoped to end these efforts by firing the first round on that glorious October 6.

Efforts to «convince», «conciliate» and «analyse» will not change the United States' position. They will only change their attitude if we fire on the enemy and attack its interests in the entire Arab land. This is the only language that the United States understands, not because they are slow to learn but because they are one with the Zionist entity.

We must not believe that the United States could adopt a «worse» attitude towards us and try to avoid this by showing ourselves «wise» and «ready to be conciliatory». The United States cannot do more than it is doing now. They have already put all their military and economic power and political influence at the enemy's disposal in order to help it recover from its severe losses. The United States is not the master of a world where it can do as it pleases. It would thus be absurd to believe that they could possibly be more hostile than they are now. The United States is certainly a great power, but it is not the only power in the world. As for us, we are not alone and without support.

As we have always insisted, it is wite and correct to be flexible in our policy toward Western Europe. Western Europe, despite the fact that it belongs to the capitalist world and has close ties to the United States, has specific

economic, political and socio-cultural characteristics that distinguish it from the latter. Its attitude toward us is relatively independent. In additon, unlike the United States, it is not in a position to defy the Arabs. Its special situation forces it to take a relatively reasonable attitude. Western Europe is concerned about its vested interests in the Arab land, and it knows that a hostile attitude toward the Arabs will endanger these interests. The nationalization of the American shares of the Basra Petroleum Company clearly showed that even American interests could not be protected. What would happen to its own vested interests? Western Europe is also trying to preserve extensive trade relations with the Arab countries. Finally, Western Europe does not have the military strength of the United States, which is another explanation for its attitude.

It is useful for us to consolidate our ties with any country that shows itself more understanding and adopts a more favorable attitude toward our cause. However, it would be absurd for us to chase after the United States. Such a policy is not as «intelligent» as some like to think, it is nothing but a «reactionary plot», contrived by the veteran Arab reactionaries, led by the Saudi government. The Arab reactionaries are not using this plot to help their Arab brothers but to avoid revealing the intimate ties between American imperialism and Zionism. The Arab reactionaries are not using this policy to temper the Americans's hostile attitude toward the Arabs, but only as a means of self defense, for once every patriotic Arab politician and all the Arab citizens are pesuaded that the United States and Israel are only two parts of one hostile force, the reactionaries will have no justification for preserving American interests in their land and maintaining disgraceful ties of dependence to the United States.

It is therefore our duty to ask whether —when we are committed to a war to the death, the blood of our valiant children is being shed, and our women fall under American bombs— can we permit ourselves to fall into the trap of the forces of Arab reaction? Can we act in a way that will end up by preserving the forces of reaction

that have lowered themselves to cowardice and collaboration with the enemy? Wouldn't it be more appropriate to concentrate our potential and our resources on the liberation of our usurped territories in order to drive back the enemy and all those who hide behind it and support it either directly or indirectly?

Now that we have reached this victorious stage of the battle and have greatly changed the balance of military forces and made the world look at us with respect, it is our duty to continue on the road we took on October 6, with resolution and determination.

We must have confidence in our courageous fighters and faith in our generous people, who will not spare any effort for our sacred cause. We must act with determination to prevent the hypocritical, cowardly and collaborating reactionaries from directing the battle toward the protection of its own vile interests.

The reactionaries' collaboration with the enemy is nothing new. The bitter consequences of the experience of 1948 should have been a sufficient lesson. In this year, the Arab nation and its armies had the capacity to prevent the creation of the Zionist entity, but the reactionaries in the service of colonialism and their cowardice and conspiracies made the Arab nation miss its opportunity. Now they are playing exactly the same role; the Western Jordain front remains silent while the fighting rages.

The Saudi regime, for its part, remains impassive and although it is geographically close to the enemy, it has not given the order to fire a single shot. It has purchased massive quantities of arms and consecrated billions of dollars to its military supplies. On the other hand, it has enlarged its system of contacts, made desperate efforts and «concocted» plans to counter the basic principle of using petroleum as a weapon. It has tried to dam the current unleashed by the nationalization of the Armerican shares in the Basra Petroleum Company.

The Arab reactionaries stand by while the blood of the nation's heroes flows on the western and northern

fronts and our women and children are killed by American bombs. Can any of us remain silent in the face of such treachery? Can we spare these criminals and traitors? Can we allow them to turn to their own interests the battle that we have been waiting for for twenty-five years and that we are fighting with courage and determination? Can we permit them to conceal the United States' alliance with our enemy and their support for the Zionists by their hupocrisy and lies?

To court the favor of the United States is to pursue a mirage and to give the forces of Arab reaction the opportunity to perpetrate their vile plots. For this reason, it would be a serious historical mistake. Arab patriots and our glorious Arab forces now have the initiative. They must keep it, and we must continue to fight with strength and profound faith. The Arab nation will never be led by cowards, hypocrites and charlatans. It will be guided by its noble and courageous sons, those who have shed their blood to preserve its honour and dignity.

Thursday, October 18, 1973

VIII

«The continuation of the fighting is the way to victory and liberation»

The Arab armed forces arte continuing their heroic struggle against the Zionist enemy on the western and northern fronts and concretely demonstrating the Arab nation's capacity to resist and victoriously confront its enemy. Their struggle has thus irrefutably confirmed the destruction of all the myths and illusions propagated and developed concerning the force, the power and the potential of the enemy, as well as those concerning Arab «impotence» in this context. These myths and illusions were assembled from a variety of fragments and tirelessly maintained in order to lead the Arab nation to abandon its rights, and to despair. This tactic is undeniably one of the principal phases of the defeatist and liquidationist plan elaborated and already put into practice by colonial-Zionist groups, with the open cooperation of the Arab reactionaries.

For the past twenty-five years (or, more precisely, since the setting up of the Zionist entity in Palestine) up to the present, our only way toward liberation has been the struggle. This was the only way in which we could confront agression, drive back the invaders and resist those who were threatening our own destiny, and even our own national existence. Nothing would help us more than to initiate a long and exacting struggle conducted on a wide scale against an enemy who, harboring illusions, blinded by his arrogance and tyranny, thought himself the master of the situation and was convinced

that, through the use of force and terror, he could make us bend before his aims and plans.

But when, on March 6, the Arab nation embarked on the path of armed struggle (and this is the only means which enabled it to wash away the humiliation inflicted upon it for so many years), the battlefield and the open fronts against the enemy have shown themselves to be the best proof of the accuracy of this path which is, without any doubt, the only one which can lead to liberation and permit us to achieve victory.

The valiant battle waged against the enemy by the Arab armed forces in the course of the last few days constitutes an irrefutable proof for the entire international community of our capacity to inflict a defeat upon the enemy from which he will not rise again. Our valiant soldiers and officers have accomplished remarkable feats of bravery and heroism which have stupefied the enemy and dragged him, with all his arrogance, into disgrace. The calculations of the forces allied with imperialism and Zionism were shown to be confused.

If the battlefield is the «field of conflict» between us and the enemy, all the indications show that we possess all the means to liberate ourselves, if we persevere in following the right and serious path. We must still always remain vigilant, always ready to lead the battle, and capable of mobilizing all our material and human potential in the service of the sacred national cause which shapes our destiny.

What our colonial and Zionist enemies fear most is our continuation and intensification of the struggle and especially the proof that our forces are more than willing to fight. In addition, our armies have inflicted severe losses on the army of the agressors and usurpers, destroyed all the Zionist illusions and disrupted all the calculations of the Zionist army. In light of the reversals it has suffered and the defeats which have been inflicted upon it, this army has found no other solution to the problem of a total rout than to call for the assistance of the American military arsenal for supplies of arms, munitions and men.

But our enemy, faced with the determination and the firm desire of the Arab nation to continue the struggle while intensifying it, to open all the Arab fronts to the battle of destiny which concerns all Arabs, can only suffer more defeats and setbacks, despite the aid it receives from colonial powers, and despite the direct or indirect intervention of the latter.

The fear and distress which struck the Zionist entity and its ally, American imperialism, are a completely natural consequence of the struggle courageously and heroically fought by the Arab armies. This fear and this distress will grow in intensity, as these struggles continue on the Arab fronts, and as the nation continues to engage the greater part of its human and material potential in the struggle, until the decisive victory.

It has become obvious that the Zionist enemy cannot sustain the weight of a long and exacting struggle engaged on a wide scale. The Zionist entity is undeniably threatened with disintegration and collapse. In the context of this truth, we must realize that the correct and sound orientation for facing the enemy is the adoption of a long-term strategy and of battle plans which will take into account the most all-encompassing national potential in military, economic and human domains.

For our part, at every opportunity we have publycly explained the way in which we conceive the nature of the struggle and its range and perspectives. Today, now that we are still on the firing line, we still hold to our notion of the struggle. In consequence, we continue to mobilize all our potential and means in order to act according to our convictions.

After the dazzling victories recorded by our armed forces, the Arab nation has been faced with a historic opportunity: it is within reach of the final victory. It is near liberation. Our ignoring of the opportunity would be an enormous loss for the nation which has committed itself to defending its highest cause.

We have right on our side. Our struggle has every historical and legal justification. And experience has shown that we can only regain our rights by means of

struggle, by means of determination and firmness, and by pursuing the combat until its final phase.

The support and sympathy which large sectors of international public opinion have expressed for our legitimate struggle for this liberation of the occupied territories can only confirm the legitimacy of the orientation which we have taken —that of struggle. The continuation of fighting until victory will be, for our part, our response to the aid furnished by the United States to the Zionist entity, aid which once again has proven the organic link between the Zionist and the imperialist tendancies directed by the United States which has a common destiny with Israel. If these links manifest themselves today in their most agressive and arrogant form, the Arab nation is perfectly capable of brandishing more than one weapon in the face of the imperialist-Zionist alliance, and of exacting high payment for its attitude in this context.

We have initiated the struggle, fully convinced of our nation's capacity to face up to the fiercest challenge. We shall continue to pursue the course in which the Arab masses have placed all their hopes and aspirations. In addition, the Arab masses have always refused to surender, and have never let themselves be subjugated by imperialism. Lastly, victory will always be on the side of those people who struggle for their just causes and legitimate demands.

Friday, October 19, 1973

IX

«How to hold on to acquired force and prestige, and how to take advantage of it?»

Two weeks have gone by, in the course of which the enemy has committed all its military force, supplied since the first day by the unending military and material assistance and political support that the United States has been able to grant it. Despite all this, the Arab fronts are still just as strong. Our soldiers have inflicted successive reversals upon the enemy and have intensified the struggle against it. At the same time, on the internal fronts the warring countries and the entire Arab homeland reaffirm their confidence in the battle and its outcome. They have strengthened their links and become more ready than ever to bring to the battle the support necessary for it to continue until the victorious outcome.

In these two weeks the Arab nation has acquired a force that it has never known in the contemporary world. It has also acquired, among the international community, a prestige which it has not enjoyed since its contemporary re-emergence.

It is sensible and appropriate that, at the present, it hold onto the sources of its force and influence in the world, that it take advantage of these effectively and that it maintain them constantly, in order to protect its position in the international community and to defend itself against harm and agression.

If, in two weeks of noble and just struggle, our nation can be so successful, it is quite certain that by continuing the struggle (which will not fail to demand enormous

sacrifices) it will become stronger. Its international position will become more important, the internal front of the warring countries will strengthen itself and the bonds of unity among these regions will be reinforced, as in the entire Arab homeland.

But, despite all the victories won in the last two decisive weeks of our history, the Zionist enemy is still there, occupying all the Arab Palestinian territory and two large areas belonging to Egypt and Syria. And, even though we have succeeded in modifying our military relationship, in shattering the arrogance of the enemy and in making it suffer considerable losses which it cannot withstand, the fact that it is still there demonstrates that we have only taken the first steps on the way to liberation and that we still have in front of us a long course which we must run in order to arrive at the final victory.

International imperialism (led by American imperialism) and the Zionist enemy, as well as the Arab reactionaries who are closely linked to the imperialist, have understood the importance of the policies pursued in the context of their interests and their destiny in the region. They understand perfectly that, in spite of the time and sacrifices required, the perseverance of the Arab nation in this direction will necessarily lead to the elimination of the agressive Zionist entity, to the opening of vast horizons permitting the liquidation of American imperialist interest and their strongholds, and to the definitive disappearance of the reactionaries from Arab political life.

This is why, by means of their position and their own resources, as well as with all the cunning they possess, these three unified forces are trying to prevent us from continuing the struggle, to hinder the deployment of our immense liberating and revolutionary potential which has not ceased to grow, and to bring the situation back to what it was before October 6, by whatever means possible. Also, the enemy is fighting more fiercely in order to score a victory which would enable it to make up for its defeat. And, since it has suffered important losses

in the course of these last two weeks, since its internal structures have been threatened by collapse and disintegration and since, as a result, its interests have been seriously injured, the enemy has thrown all its military potential into the struggle. The American imperialists have acted here on several levels: they have very generously furnished the enemy with an inappreciably high volume of military and material aid in order to avoid a stinging military defeat, since that would mean the loss to the Americans of the most important base and most effective instrument of agression which they possess in the region. At the same time, this power, through all declared and hidden resources, seeks to strengthen the position of the Arab reactionaries, its accomplices, to enable them to play a role which will influence events in the favor of the interests of imperialism, in concurrence with its policies and goals. Besides, even though two children would not even argue over the question of whether or not the United States incited the enemy to agression, and even children would agree in recognizing that the United States supplied all the means necessary for continuing this agression and for avoiding defeat, this power now plays the role of being concerned about «peace», about the «security of the peoples» of the region and «their rights». So doing, it hopes to show that it can have a «reasonable» and «neutral» position vis-a-vis the Arabs, whose soldiers, women and children were killed by its weapons. By means of this attitude, it would succeed on both sides: that of the enemy, which is already in its pocket, and that of the Arabs (by exerting influence on certain of their sectors in order to halt the rising anger and to prevent the total liquidation of its interests.

As for the Arab reactionary puppets, they know, through their own experiences, that the continuation of the struggle against the Zionist enemy, as it has proceeded in the last two weeks, will necessarily lead to a modification of the military relationship in the region in a sense contrary to that of their interests, hopes and goals. A military defeat of the enemy would mean the

defeat of imperialism and when imperialism is defeated in the region, its allies, the Arab reactionaries, will have no choice but to withdraw.

If, up to the present, there have been those among us who knew neither the real intentions of the imperialists, nor those of the reactionaries, in their true light, it remains for us to review the process which engendered the so-called «political solution», a process which has existed for more than six years, from the agression of June, 1967, up to October 6, 1973. In the course of these years, all our hopes to see the United States take a «reasonable» or «neutral» position vis-a-vis the Arabs in order to protect their interests in the region were shown to be in vain. The same holds for all the hopes which we placed in the capacity of the reactionay Arab leaders to exert an influence on American policies whose effect would be to reduce the support granted to the tyrannical and contemptuous enemy.

Six dark and difficult years have gone by during which the Arab cause has been trampled on and its nation humiliated, whereas the United States has maintained its position, and the Arab reactionaries have taken advantage of it to achieve a machiavellian consolidation of their positions, by means of lies and attempts to orient events in ways favorable to their interests.

Two weeks were enough to drastically change things. Today, the Arabs are capable of imposing their will, for they desire their rights, liberty and justice and they will obtain them on the field of battle. This is the only road which leads to liberty and the only one which allows them to recover their usurped rights and to erase the humiliation from their memories.

We are telling nothing but the truth, since all the American and reactionary advances which have appeared on the scene are conspiracies whose goal is to exclude the enormous revolutionary and liberating Arab potential from the battle, and to give the battle an incorrect orientation. If they realize these plans —against which the Arab masses and armies would no doubt rise in opposition— these two parties could carry out reprisals

against the forces who, in the course of only two weeks of fighting, showed an extraordinary capacity to carry out the national will and to recover their usurped rights through a noble and courageous struggle, not through a shameful retreat.

It is through a resolute and courageous armed struggle that we have secured the force, the prestige and the power of dissuasion which we hold today. In fact, by following this direction, by strengthening the unity among warring regions, by mobilizing all military, economic, human and political capabilities and by hurling them into the struggle, we have developed our strength, prestige and power of dissuasion.

For this reason, when we have reached the final stage of the battle of liberation, we will be able to force the enemy and its master, imperialism, to hand over our rights, all our usurped rights.

The continuation of the fighting is the road of strength and of wisdom. We will continue to follow the road with firmness and courage in order to achieve our victory!

Ever forward!

Saturday, October 20, 1973

X

Towards new initiatives concerning the use of the weapon of petroleum

«After the failure of the Kuwait conference and its insignificant decisions»

Here is a new proof of the ineffectiveness of the enlarged Arab conference, when it concerns the examination of subjects determining national character. In fact, after these summit conferences and meetings of foreign and defense ministers had failed in their asttempt to elaborate plans for the formation of an effective Arab front reflecting the actual capacities and resources of the nation. The Kuwait Conference was held last Wednesday to study the way in which petroleum could be used as weapon. This only accentuated, by its insignificant results, the enormous gap between its conclusions and the manifold possibilites for petroleum to be used as a weapon by the Arab nation. As proof, the decision made by Abu-Dhabi and Libya after the conference to put a total embargo on petroleum going to the United States constitutes an obvious demonstration of the nation's potential capacities, capacities which are considerably reduced in the absence of unanimity.

In the practical context, the calling of these meetings has brought about three incontestably negative results. (We do not want to place the blame on anyone). First, it delays the taking of a position at a moment when time plays an important role. Second, as a result of incessant discussions and useless studies, it weakens the powerful voice of the masses who demand very specific action. Finally, it lowers the level of subjects treated to a minimal one, since these sorts of conferences only arrive

at minimal decisions agreed upon by those governments with the least desire for assuming their national responsibilities.

The regrettable and well known «five per cent» decision —the reduction of petroleum production— made by the Kuwait Conference, gives no indication of the real capacities of the Arab nation to use petroleum as an economic, political and psychological weapon in the struggle. Abu-Dhabi has ceased production of petroleum going to the United Sttates and has been followed by Libya. And before their action, even before the Kuwait conference was held, Iraq had perfectly and decisively shown how petroleum could be used as a weapon by nationalizing the American interests in the Basra Petroleum Company. So the decision made at the Kuwait Conference does not reflect the positions and opinions of certain parties who have no desire to use petroleum as a weapon but who, under the pressure of powerful popular demands and the circumstances of the war, were forced to agree. All of us know that the Saudi leaders were at the base of the appeal against the use of petroleum as a weapon, since they are closely linked to American policies, and since they constitute, among the Arabs, the most docile instruments of these policies whose consequences are immeasurable. But, at the end of the conference, whose results elicited the opposition and contempt of the masses, even they were forced to act differently. They then declared a 20% reduction in the production of petroleum and, yesterday, halted production.

One would say that Iraq's historic decision to nationalize the American shares of the Basra Petroleum Company brought about the defeat of this conference even before it was held. Following that, the position of Abu-Dhabi and Libya gave the finishing touch. Is it then right ro refer to the Kuwait Conference and its results as the taking of an «Arab» position? Absolutelly not! The decisions made are a scandal whose traces should be wiped away by initiatives on the part of petroleum producing states who have no part in the resolution of

this regrettably famous conference. The best way to achieve this is through the nationalization of American interests. The minimum acceptable response would be a complete petroleum embargo on the United States with the added threat of a ceasing of the flow of oil to any state taking a position similar to that of the United States.

Here it is indispensable to mention our position in regard to Western Europe. The reactionary Arab sectors linked to the United States have tried to generalize the reduction of production in a way which would affect Western Europe. If this initiative would benefit anyone, it would be the United States and the Zionist enemy. We must absolutely continue, then, to supply Japan and Western Europe with petroleum and to avoid provoking any crisis for them, for we would thus encourage Western Europe to move in the direction of a more pro-Arab position, to reduce its dependence on the United States, and to weaken the influence which Zionism holds over it. Also, such a generalization would put Western Europe in the American camp and that of the enemy. This is precisely what these two parties are trying to achieve through the Arab regimes who are agents of American imperialism. We must reject this suspicious project and show it in its true light.

The Arab nation is still capable of intensifying the struggle of petroleum. The time which it has lost cannot be regained, but it now must take even bolder initiatives in this regard. Arab governments, such as Kuwait, who, given their economic situation and potential, are capable only of taking a position similar to that of Abu-Dhabi and Libya, but also of initiating the nationalization of American interests.

What are these Arab petroleum producing states waiting for, especially now that we are already in the third week of fighting with the enemy?

Sunday, October 21, 1973

XI

All of us know that Iraq has been an independent country for a long time. (And if we remind the reader of this, it is not merely to tire him with facts that he already knows perfectly; it is only as an introduction to the remarks which we are going to make about what has happened and what is still taking place today in Arab and international politics!) Besides, man can never succeed, at all times, in avoiding the repetitive recollection of banalities, even in conversation with brothers and friends who know him and whom he knows. Since one of the faults of the human being is his short memory, the fact that he forgets, we say:

«Remind, since the recollection can be useful»*

When we say that the Iraqi region is an independent one, this does not mean that it does not have brothers, and that it does not have practical and theoretical obligations to fulfill which are assumed in this situation. Nor does this mean that it does not have friends with whom it is closely linked and reciprocal obligations. This also could be listed under the heading of banalities: Iraq is a part of the great Arab land and it is also a member of the international community. This country has a profound faith in the unity of the Arab nation and the

* Taken from a verse of the *Koran*.

community of its destiny and it also believes in the alliance between the Arab revolutionary movement and the international revolutionary movement.

Also, its people is resolved to play the part of the avant-garde of the struggle for freedom, unity and progress of its nation, neither through verbalism nor constraint, but through sacrifice, generosity and good example. It is also determined to set this good example in its relations with its friends and in loyalty to its agreements with them, especially in times when loyalty is rare.

By virtue of its profound faith in its national task, Iraq has answered the call to duty and has defended the honour and teritories of the nation. It has done this even though it was only through a radio broadcast that it learned the news of the entry into war of its sister countries, Egypt and Syria. Far from blaming anyone, it rushed, with extraordinary speed and great generosity, to put all its military and economic means at the service of the struggle. (Remember that we are not making this up. This is the absolute truth). It also made maximum use of sound revolutionary thought to overcome obstacles, to resolve problems, and to prepare the ground which enabled it to give all it possessed to the struggle, without turning away or hindering it. Also, in order to meet the needs of the battle with desired speed, it resorted to military and political measures which according to traditional political and military criteria would be considered adventurous.

Iraq has given much, but it is ready to give even more in the future, out of loyalty to the cause of its nation, the nation whose sovereignty and dignity are still trampled on by the imperialist-Zionist enemy. Moving from the principle that the demands of the war should take precedence over any other consideration of no matter what importance, Iraq has considered the situation as a whole and acted in complete confidence.

At the same time, Iraq knew, and still knows, that the international community has organizations which direct a certain number of its affairs, and that these

organizations have duties and commitments on issues such as peace or war in the world. Iraq is certainly conscious of the incapacity, proved during the last twenty-five years, of the organizations to aid the Arabs or to defend them against agression and usurpation. But this time, it expected that they would begin to act and intervene in the war which broke out on October 6. Iraq knows well that the members of these organizations are not on the same level of equality in the context of force and influence, even if they are equal legally! This fact is particularly apparent in the Security Council, in which the great powers have particular positions and special privileges. It is also aware that the two super powers each have special positions and powers greater than those of the other countries, whether small or large. It knows that the Soviet Union and the United States —from the position of principles and respective objectives— are capable, if they wish, of settling numerous world problems, even in cases where they have opposing positions (the Soviet Union falling on the side of the Arabs and supporting them and the United States taking the cause of the enemy and aiding it). At the same time, Iraq knows that its friends, including the Soviet Union, have, as a result of their particular conception and international responsibilities, some opinions which do not agree perfectly with ours concerning certain questions, in particular concerning the conflict which exists between us and the Zionist enemy.

We knew all this, at the moment where we joined the war by committing all our resources and disregarding the sacrifices to be made. During the fighting we certainly deployed extraordinary efforts to intensify the battle, and we had no illusions about the expectations and capacities of the parties in question, nor about the «limits» which it was possible to reach. All the same, and it is here where we were mistaken, we thought that given the haste in which we engaged ourselves in the struggle with all our resources, despite the fact that we had been informed of the outbreak of hostilities by radio, our brothers and friends considered that it was impossible that Iraq would

accept not being consulted during the formulation of decisions, whereas it consituted an essential force in the battle.

Iraq did not just offer «aid», as others did, so that it could be satisfied by a mere «thank you». It participated with all it possessed. Let us hope that those who succeeded in obtaining the declaration of October 22 know that without this military and economic presence of Iraq in the war, their position in the negotiations which resulted in the final «peaceful solution» would have been different —with other results.

As we have already said, we hold no illusions concerning the conceptions, capacities and limits of the warring parties. We had and still have well known opinions on the entire question and we know exactly what the others' opinions are.

Despite all this, we participated in the war and committed all our resources. The Iraqi country and the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party, which directs the revolution, have brothers and dear friends, toward which they can only act according to a position of principle, accomplishing all their responsibilities to their brothers and friends. At the same time we shall say with frankness: Iraq is an independent country, its people have an independent will and opinion. If we overlook the fact that we were not informed of the decision concerning the outbreak of hostilities, and that we participated without holding any resentment, Iraq absolutely cannot accept that the news of the ceasing of hostilities reach it by radio, while its army is engaged in a fierce struggle on a wide-scale against the enemy.

All our brothers and friends should know this.

Thursday, October 25, 1973